As I have shown in my previous blog posts, I am opposed to the continuous military intervention that has taken place over the course of Pakistan's history. However, what would be idiotic of me would be to ignore the causes which led to the rise of the military. Even though I feel that the disdain that the Pakistani people have towards our civilian leaders has been unfair to some extent, I also share their pain in their frustration towards the civilian leaders. Obviously, there are many perspectives in regards to Pakistan's formation years, but the most critical period to be analyzed in understanding the rise of the military and the decay of the democratic/political power is from 1947-1958.
In this blogpost, I will analyze( through the help of sources) the anti-Ahmadi riots that took place in 1953 in Lahore over the course of 3 months. The Anti-Ahmadi riots stemmed from the fact that many of Pakistan's right-wing leaders and activists( including Maududi Sahab, founder of Jamat-e-Islami) were opposed to the fact that the Ahmadis were involved in the civil service sphere, and also could serve positions in the army.
Justice Munir and Justice Kiyani in 1954 compiled a fascinating 300 page report titled Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954 (Punjab Disturbances 1953. In it, they analyzed two factors that I believe are critical to our understanding of Pakistan today. First, they analyzed how the military stepped in to save Lahore from a state of chaos( through the complete mismanagement of the civilian leaders). Second, they excellently pointed out the outright ridiculous nature of the right-wing radical Islamists. Through his interrogation of Maududi, The Report shows just how alienated and hypocritical these conservative thinkers were in relation to Islam. In this blog, I will talk about the first factor( the handling of the Riots), and in the next blog will focus on Maududi).
* I do understand that the military/bureaucracy complex is essential in understanding how the military was able to assert itself directly into politics, however for the sake of convenience, I will explore that aspect in another blog*
Pakistan as a nation went through seven prime ministers from 1951 to 1958. During this time, Ayub Khan, who would become the first military dictator of Pakistan, solidified his position in order to take over the country. Even though critics of the military rightly point out the military’s intervention in the political sphere, they often do not link the shortcomings of the civilian leaders. Through the reading of the current Pakistan Ambassador to the USA(Husain Haqqani) text, it can certainly be shown as to how the military was able to stage a takeover in 1958. The military, Haqqani asserts, “had fought India in 1947-1948, helped resettle the refugees, and provided crucial assistance during national disasters such as floods.” Haqqani, in analyzing the anti-Ahmadi riots that broke out in Pakistan, asserts that “the military stepped in to deal with the symptoms of the chaos generated by religious-political agitation, without any effort to deal with its causes.” Former BBC Correspondent to Pakistan Owen Bennett Jones however finds a different perspective on the military’s role in Pakistan from 1947-58. Jones writes that “indeed, the army soon became the only organization capable of keeping order on all the streets, and in 1953 the relative power and competence of the military and the civilians became plain for all to see.” Jones then critiques the role of the civilian government in the rots by asserting that in 1953, “by March the civilian government had to admit that it had lost control of events and it asked the army to take over Lahore. The martial law administrator in the city, General Azam Khan, soon managed to restore calm…. In the eyes of many, martial law in Lahore proved that, whereas the civilian politicians consistently failed to provide effective government, the military could deliver. By asking the army to manage a political crisis the civilians had undermined their own authority.”
A careful examination of a Report that was written by Justice Munir( Supreme Court Justice) shows a similar picture in relation to the Anti-Ahmadi riots. In the " Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954 (Punjab Disturbances 1953),” the military is seen as the last force that stood between the civil government and the radical Islamists who created chaos in Lahore. Infact, the report critiques the civil government by saying that “the challenge of the Majlis-i-Amal was not treated seriously by either Government. Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din was hoping to the last moment that something happy will turn up, while the Provincial Government seemed satisfied that the agitation will start in Karachi.” The Report mocks the civilian government by saying that "The administrative machinery had completely failed and no one was willing or anxious to face the responsibility of enforcing the law, either by arresting offenders or preventing the perpetration of crime....the whole situation was treated as a peaceful theatrical performance where processions are stage-managed and slogans raised,for the benefit of a contented audience." The Report also adds that "The civil authorities, who in normal times are responsible for the maintenance of law and order, had become completely helpless and lost all desire and ability to cope with the situation that had developed on the morning of 6th March."
The Report claimed that in the fear of excessive bloodshed due to civil unrest, the civilian government was scared to give military control of Lahore when the riots took place. However, the Report defends the peaceful nature of the military by saying that “reluctance to hand over to the Army out of fear of bloodshed might be understandable if not exactly excusable, but what is the excuse for not adopting even the peaceable methods suggested and later employed by General Azam?” The Report further defends the army by stressing that “in Sialkot, at least two situations were handed over to the military, and there was no fear that the army might take such complete control of it as to oust civil authority. Nor was there any apprehension that there might be bloodshed.” The civilian government used the local police till March 6th, even though they knew that the Police was acting not within the accords of standard procedure. Infact, the Report criticizes the government's reluctance to employ military troops; " It may not be correct that the Army could be dispensed with altogether, but it is true that considerations extraneous to those of pure law and order have influenced the action of the civil authority. The Government were reluctant to employ the troops unreservedly, for fear of bloodshed, as Mr. Anwar Ali says, and the Ministers were upset with the protests of leading citizens that the police were firing even on violent crowds—even on violent crowds." General Azam, who was widely hailed by the Report and by the people for the management of the crisis, was frustrated with the civilian government's amateur handling of the situation.The Report affirms this explanation: "The military were not merely to act free of civil control; they were also to advise the civil authority where the situation was not being dealt with firmly. But we think we have heard from Mr.Chundrigar that General Azam did complain to him that the police had become demoralised, which should have made it clear to the civil authority that no situation was being dealt with firmly by the police."
The Report shows the ridiculous paranoia of the civilian leaders to not use the Army, even though the police was making a mockery of law and order. The civilian leadership, by going out of their way to not have the military involved, only added further chaos to the riots. Infact, the only thing that the civilian leaders wanted to do was to accuse the military of mismanaging the crisis, while not appreciating their intervension. Infact, the Report claims that " we were agreeably surprised to find from the evidence led before us that although every witness felt that the troops had not given of their best, they based their feeling on what they had heard from some other person. Ultimately, some of them referred us to the District Magistrate, and the District Magistrate told us he was perfectly satisfied with the part played by the troops."
Looking back at this Report, it is alarming to note the sheer incompetence of the civilian government. It is no wonder that the military was looked upon more in favor than the civilian government from 1947-58. The handling of these anti-Ahmadi riots provide a clear picture as to which entity was looked upon more favorably by the end of these riots. Khawaja Nazimuddin would be dismissed, Muhammad Ali Bogra would then become Prime Minister, and the facade of civilian leadership would evaporate even further, as the military would strengthen its grip.
* The Source that have helped me write this blog have been*
1. Owen Bennett Jones- Eye of the Storm
2. 1954 Justice Munir Report( God bless him for the Report)
3. Husain Haqqani- Betwen Mosque and Military
4. The Mullah and the Munir REport- Yasser Latif Hamdani
And many more
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