On October 22nd, 2010 it was announced that Washington would be providing the Pakistan military with a new $2 billion military aid package in a joint effort to combat extremism in Afghanistan (And North-West regions of Pakistan). The general consensus amongst Pakistanis has not been one of enthusiasm as they generally feel that the United States/Pakistan military diplomacy cripples not only Pakistan’s future as a stable state but also appears contrary to Pakistan’s identity. The people of Pakistan have also questioned the United States and their intentions in regards to being engaged in a fragile relationship with Pakistan. If one is to understand whether our current diplomacy with the United States appears contrary to our identity, one has to examine the origins of not only our current foreign policy with the United States, but the origins of diplomacy with the United States and what caused that diplomacy to connect.
The origin of Pakistan’s foreign policy has not been shaped by Pakistan’s quest for imperial dominance or a sense of commercial expansionism. It has rather been shaped by one factor. Pakistan’s struggle for survival originated itself in the late 1940’s and has characterized Pakistani diplomacy ever since. The partition of India made sure that Pakistan inherited problems that would quite simply be impossible to tackle. Pakistan inherited three main problems.
1. India’s reluctance to initially accept Pakistan: Husain Haqqani, in his book “Between Mosque and Military” and Stephen Cohen in his book “ The Idea of Pakistan” share similar sentiments in regards to how India and its leaders perceived the independence of Pakistan. According to Haqqani, “when Pakistan was finally born, it faced an environment of insecurity and hostility, with many Indian leaders predicting the early demise of the new country.” Cohen shares similar sentiments. “ The Indian National Congress had accepted partition grudgingly, expecting a fairly immediate collapse.”
2. Pakistan’s non-existent Economy due to partition: Cohen and Haqqani also share similar viewpoints in regards to how the partition adversely affected Pakistan’s economy. Haqqani, in analyzing the newly established Pakistan industries, writes, “Pakistan produced 75 percent of the world’s jute supply but did not have a single jute-processing mill. All the mills were in India. Although one-third of undivided India’s cotton was grown in Pakistan, it had ‘only one-thirtieth of the cotton mills… The flight of capital was attributed to ‘uncertainties about Pakistan’s capacity to survive and the communal disturbances…within days of independence, Pakistan was concerned about its share of India’s assets, both financial and military. India’s decision to delay transferring Pakistan’s share of assets increased the bitterness of partition.” Infact, Stephen Cohen writes critically that the obvious detrimental effects of partition were so incriminating against India that “ it was Gandhi who undertook a fast unto death to protest India’s retention of Pakistan’s assets and Hindu and Sikh attacks on Muslims in India.”
3. Kashmir: Perhaps what the final striking blow between India and Pakistan was Pakistan’s notion that India (Nehru) had refused to fulfill his promise of a Kashmir plebiscite in 1947. Hari Singh, who was a Hindu ruler of a Muslim-majority Kashmir in 1947, had to chose on whether to accede to Pakistan, India or stay independent. The Maharaja was primarily interested in economic benefits and was not influenced by the emotions of partition, as he had enjoyed a great level of autonomy during Colonial rule in India. The Maharaja was motivated essentially by economic stability, thus he decided to accede to India in return for commercial/economic benefits( due to partition favoring India in terms of stable institutions). The Muslims in Pakistan felt betrayed, and thus tribal groups from NWFP tried to restore Kashmir under Muslim rule. Due to lack of co-ordination between Pakistan’s (new formed) army and the rebel fighters, they were not successful, and thus Kashmir’s proposed elections went into a state of limbo. What ignited furor amongst Pakistanis was also the fact was Junagarh’s(Hindu majority state) assimilation with India, even though it had a Muslim ruler.
Pakistan’s viewpoint of India deceiving them with promised plebiscites only ensured their perspective that India was “against” Pakistan. Pakistan’s frustration only grew as time went by due to their lack of political influence over the region. Walter Wallbank writes that by the mid 1950’s the Kashmir’s “ development had been in India’s favor. A constituent assembly had been elected which had ensured Sheikh Abdullah’s pro-Indian part, the National Conference, of overwhelming control of the country. To all intents and purposes only one party had been allowed to participate in this selection.” Kashmir would become Pakistan’s core issue for decades to come.
Pakistan was essentially a ticking time bomb. Its economy was dismantling before it could stand on its own two feet, while a bigger/more powerful nation was waiting for its imminent demise. While Pakistan was figuring out its internal problems, it had to set a mandate for its external policies, namely its diplomacy. Driven primarily by economic interests along with security against India, Pakistan went out to take advantage of the Cold War syndrome. As the weaker nation, Pakistan’s establishment decided to seek alliance with the Western world. Perhaps what is most interesting is the fact that even though Pakistan’s diplomacy with the United States was shaped primarily after Jinnah’s death, Jinnah would have envisioned the same kind of foreign policy as that employed by the leaders that succeeded him.
In an interview with Life Magazine in 1947, Jinnah claimed that “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America…Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed…. [on] the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.” Centering Pakistan as a pivotal geographical location for the chess game between the United States and Russia, Jinnah claimed that “America is now awakened,” and “ if Russia walks in here, the whole world is menaced.” Jinnah would finally assert; “surely America will give us loans to keep Russia from walking in.” Thus, Pakistan’s diplomacy in the 1950’s was in actuality a mere continuation of what her Founder had envisioned. Jinnah understood Pakistan’s vulnerability, and he understood that Pakistan’s geographical position could be pivotal in securing its economic/military interest for the future.
The unofficial war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir in 1948 created paranoia amongst Pakistani leaders that India would seize upon any opportunity to purposely weaken Pakistan and its sovereignty. Pakistan army’s (alleged) use of irregular forces in 1948 only raised the question as to how strong the Pakistan army really was, and whether it could sustain a possible attack from India. Besides, Pakistan’s military institution never wanted to create an illusion that they were militarily weaker than India(even though India’s population alone makes a striking case against Pakistan’s military). Kashmir as an issue was far from solved for Pakistani leaders in the 1950’s, and thus they envisioned foreign assistance that would strengthen their military institution for a possible future operation in Kashmir.
According to historian Walter Walbank, Liaqat Ali Khan enforced Jinnah’s viewpoint in 1951. “ Liaquat Ali Khan…went to the United States and Canada. Apparently it was the prime minister’s tactic to use the possibility of Russian ties as a means of exerting pressure on Western nations, especially in obtaining support in Kashmir… Pakistan definitely moved away from a position of non-alignment in the direction of closer relations with the West, especially the Untied States.” Pakistan’s defense treaty with the United States ensured that a substantial amount of military equipment be made available to Pakistan[Some estimates claim that United States covered 50% expense of Pakistan’s total budget of defense]. The strong ties between the United States and Pakistan would also be shown in Pakistan’s association with The Baghdad Pact of 1955, which assured Pakistan’s strong link with the United States in fighting Soviet Communism in Central Asia.
As Stephen Cohen notes, “ From 1954 to 1965 Pakistan was allowed to purchase weapons and received a mixture of military assistance in the form of grants and aid…This enabled it to build a modern army and a very efficient air force whose quality was enhanced by cooperative arrangement with several Gulf States.” The magnitude of United States’ military assistance to Pakistan is clearly evident by the fact that General Ayub Khan in 1965 launched “Operation Gibralter” to liberate Kashmir. The failure of Operation Gibraltar, combined with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s policy of alienation towards the United States ended the first term of military assistance by the United States to Pakistan. The second Phase would start in 1979 with Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s foreign relations in the late 1940’s and 1950’s were formed primarily by its internal dilemmas that it faced. Fear from India’s superior military institution( due to partition and population) combined with the unfortunate state of the economy due to the 1947 partition made Pakistan rely on a foreign entity that would ensure its survival. The United States required Pakistan as an ally in order to combat possible Soviet influence in Middle East/Asia, while Pakistan required the United States as an ally in order to essentially give her breathing space against its nemesis India. Pakistan’s diplomacy in the late 1940’s and the decade of 1950’s was one structured by practicality. This practicality was essential to make a nation so hard-struck by partition survive. Perhaps what it is most ironic is the fact that 63 years later Pakistan is still in a rather similar state of “survival”, while its biggest military benefactor still remains the United States and India remains Pakistan’s biggest foe.
