In February of 1953, there was an imminent threat towards the destruction of law and order in Pakistan. Islamic-based parties ferociously campaigned on forcing the government to pass a law that declared the Ahmadis non-Muslims. Similarly, they also wanted the civilian government to pass a law that would restrict Ahmadis from serving any positions related to the government or the army. The civilian government (led by Khawaja Nazimuddin) did not take the threats seriously, and they soon paid the price. Riots broke out in the streets of Lahore, and by March 6th the civilian government and the police had lost all control of law and order in Punjab. The civilian government, in a desperate bid to retain control of the situation, let the army intervene. Martial law was declared, and within a month, the riots were suppressed and law and order was restored in Pakistan. General Azam stepped in when the civilian government asked him to, and the army suppressed the forces that threatened the nation’s foundation (then best explained by the Objectives Resolution of 1949). [1]
Four coups and fifty-seven years later, the relationship between the civilian government and the army has completely broken down. Civilian governments have constantly displayed their inefficiency to properly govern, while military rule has constantly inserted itself into politics via the “doctrine of necessity.” Today, the civilian government is in a state of utmost fragility, as displayed by the inhumane assassination of the late Governor Mr. Salmaan Taseer last week. The assassination has sparked the debate once again about the sensitivity of Islam in the political sphere. Though it was maintained that the blasphemy law would not be changed, the religious parties still resorted to issuing fatwas and threats against the late Governor. The Governor had remained steadfast in his position on the misuse of the blasphemy law. Judging from the track record of the implementation of the blasphemy law, the governor was not mistaken. Just as the flaws in the other laws of our society, the blasphemy law (implemented in 1985 without the consent of the parliament) was a victim to our incompetent judicial system. The primary indication of this can be shown in the fact that more Muslims have been jailed for “alleged” blasphemy than any other religion, while there have not been any punishments carried out by the Higher Courts. Similarly, the case of arresting an alleged blasphemer has never required the presence of a separate judicial magistrate that can investigate the merits of each case. Most alarming of all, there is no exercise set in motion examining the validity of the accuser’s allegations[2]. Mr. Taseer was a victim to rising religious intolerance, ignorance and the misrepresentation by the media of what he actually critiqued.
The military meanwhile has remained silent, as experts ponder whether it is waiting for the civilian administration to implode just as it did in 1958, 1978 and 1999. The notion that the military has remained apolitical since Musharraf’s resignation is false. It was General Kayani who was instrumental in convincing Zardari in 2008 to give into the public pressure and reinstate the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court( Iftikhar Chaudhry). Similarly, General Kayani also played a significant role in the formation of the 18th Amendment, which would see the powers of the executive be more in accord with the 1973 Constitution[3]. Last, but not the least, it is General Kayani who plays the most executive role in determining the magnitude of Pakistan’s involvement in the war against extremism in Pakistan, especially the areas of North Waziristan and South Waziristan. The real question thus arises; is it within the interests of the military to be involved in this current saga? The answer is both yes and no.
In 1953, the army and the civilian government drew a clear line as to what was right and wrong. They preferred the preservation of our institutions as set by our Founders (protection of minorities) to the religious intolerance of our Islamic parties. However, much has changed in 57 years. Political leaders, both civil and military, have maintained strong ties with Islamist parties in order to prolong their political rule and advance nationalist causes. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave into the Islamist demands by declaring the Ahmadis as non-Muslims, along with his restriction of alcohol, gambling and his promise to declare Sharia Law within six months (he did not stay in power long enough to implement such laws). General Zia-ul-Haq(with the consent of the Americans) used Islamist forces to combat the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the militants have often been used by Army Chiefs as assets against India. Due to the uneasy relationship with the Islamist parties, combined with Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization of Pakistan’s institutions, Pakistan today can’t draw the line between what is black and white as it did in 1953. A possible critique by the Pakistan army of the Islamist parties or the radical elements of Islam may lead to a backlash far worse than the one that Musharraf faced with the siege of the Lal Masjid(which some saw as an attack by a secular army chief towards Islam). It is important to have a brief overview of the shifting balance of Islam within the army institution of Pakistan over the course of the past 64 years.
The Pakistan army has been known to be very secular in nature throughout most of its history. Pakistan’s military till the 1970’s was very liberal in its outlook, as a lot of the army officers traced their origins to fighting for the British during World War II. The army personal of higher and lower ranks had substantial interaction with Indian soldiers before partition. In fact, the first two Army Chiefs of Pakistan were British. Similarly, after the British influence had died due to decaying colonial imperialism, the Pakistani army turned towards the United States. Ayub Khan actively pursued an alliance with the United States during the Cold War, and many Pakistani soldiers went to the United States for training purposes. During the 70’s(after the fall of East Pakistan), Islamic values and military prowess started to dominate the army institution[4]. The two main reasons for this change were the lack of military unity following the 1971 war (the end of the U.S./Pak alliance), combined with Zia-ul-Haq’s tenure of nine years. Anti-Indianism, the manipulation of the education curriculum and the viewpoint of “ the us vs. them” mentality were changing the shape of the military institution.
Even though Zia died, his legacy remained within the institution. This was shown in 1995, when Major General Zahir-ul-Islam Abbasi tried to stage a coup within the military institution. Even though he failed, the growing Islamism within the military was there for all to see. Abbasi was inspired by the religious doctrines of the Islamist parties, and thus decided in September 1995 that he would take over the army institution. His reason? “ He had planned to storm the GHQ during a meeting of corps commanders, kill the participants, arrest other prominent personalities and impose sharia, or Islamic law…Abbasi planned to proclaim himself not only the chief of the army staff but also the leader of the faithful, or Amir ul Momineen”[5]. General Jahangir Karmat slowly eroded Zia-ul-Haq’s influence by advocating unofficial set of guidelines that did not see “religious-minded” military personal receive higher promotions. It is safe to assume that General Musharraf was also like-minded with this approach within the military institutions. Politically, he did ban tribes such as Lashkir-e-Taiba, however he similarly allowed all the religious parties considerable momentum with his toleration of the MMA(an alliance of many religious parties).
General Kayani and the army’s role in the operation against the militants in SWAT was seen as a welcoming sign, as it united Pakistanis initially against rising extremist forces which challenged Pakistan’s sovereignty. However, the enthusiasm has died over the past 18 months, as suicide bombings have increased exponentially, combined with the highly unpopular drone strikes. Kayani realizes this, and he has been known to play his cards very shrewdly, as he contemplates a future for Afghanistan in which there exists a government that is not hostile towards Pakistan. This has all led to the army’s apolitical behavior on the surface of things.
Even though the military has mostly played sensitive to not stirring up religious sentiments, they have acted fast towards the concept of justice when it threatened their own lives. During Musharraf’s reign, there had been many failed assassination attempts. One of the assassination attempts involved a soldier named Islamuddin Siddiqui, who was a combatant in the Pakistan army. He was soon executed for his role in conspiring against Musharraf. Qadri and Siddiqui are not all too dissimilar in terms of their respected cases. Siddiqui conspired to kill Musharraf due to Musharraf’s viewpoint on tackling what he believed to be a misrepresentation of Islam (namely the Taliban and the insurgent groups). Salman Taseer was combating the misuse of the blasphemy law, which had been exploited for personal gains( Salman Taseer’s case is actually a lot stronger, as he never endangered any lives with his critique of the implementation of the blasphemy law). If Islamuddin Siddiqui had been successful in assassinating Musharraf, there is no doubt that the military would have carried out speedy justice regardless of what the public sentiment might have been towards Musharraf. Mumtaz Qadri was responsible for the unlawful death of a politician who only stood up for the oppressed, and he (Qadri) deserves speedy justice at the hands of a fair and impartial judiciary.
If the civilian government is unable to prosecute (or handle) Qadri due to the lawlessness of those who try to suppress “insaaf,” then the military needs to step in. The army would not have to intervene in order to defend or repeal the blasphemy law, but rather like in the situation of 1953, it would need to be called out to the streets to restore law and order. This way, they can at least project an image that they have been called into action not due to their political inclinations, but rather as a last resort by the civilian administration in order to save the nation. The army loves to play the “doctrne of necessity,” and in this situation it could possibly benefit both institutions. Kayani likes to think long-term, and this is a situation where he absolutely has to think as such. Islamist parties have long been tolerated for expressing their unreasonable viewpoints through force and coercions in regards to religion. However, another line would be drawn if they try to challenge a judicial verdict or try to negatively influence a judiciary (through threats or fatwas). Should there be any instant in which Mumtaz Qadri’s court hearing does not go in accords with the law, or that he is not handed out his proper punishment due to the lack of the ability of the government to tackle opposition forces, Kayani should not turn the other way. If he does, it will not only endanger whatever is left of Pakistan’s judicial system, it will also detriment all hopes for a stable Pakistan in the future, one that the army would probably be interested in ruling again one day.
SOURCES:
1.Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954( Punjab Disturbances 1953)
2.For more information on the history of the blasphemy law in Pakistan, see the link: http://mazdoorkissan.wordpress.com/2010/11/13/blasphemy-and-the-death- penalty-asia-bibis-case/
3.General in The 'Hood. Indrani Bagchi.
4.Stephen Cohen. The Idea of Pakistan. P. 102-3
5.Owen Bennett Jones. Eye of the Storm. P. 262
