On 17th August 1988, Zia Ul Haq mysteriously died in a plane crash. His 11-year tyrannical tenure was marked with rising Islamization of Pakistan, combined with the absolute manipulation of the education curriculum. Perhaps the most damaging aspect of his rule was his absolute suppression of political parties that opposed his leadership. However, in the 1980’s, with the help of the resilience of Muhammad Khan Junejo and the MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy), Pakistan would finally see its long awaited return to democracy. On December 1st, 1988, after a long struggle of fighting military dictatorship, Pakistan and the Islamic world would witness its first women Prime Minister. Benazir Bhutto would start a new era in Pakistani Politics, namely the decade of Democracy. However, this era/period of a little more than a decade would come to a screeching halt on October 12th, 1999 as General Pervaiz Musharraf would invoke Martial Law to remove Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The Pakistani public on October 12th 1999 did not exhibit the same enthusiasm towards its democratically elected leaders as it did eleven years ago. Rather, people were generally content with the re-establishment of military rule in Pakistan. How did the decade of democracy fail to an extent that just eleven years after Benazir Bhutto’s parliamentary victory people looked upon her and her archrival Nawaz Sharif with utter disdain? This can best be described by 4 simple factors.
1. Benazir Bhutto vs. Nawaz Sharif: The decade of democracy can generally be described as one long war between Pakistan’s two most popular leaders. After Zia Ul Haq’s death, power was up for grabs in Pakistan, as the military knew that it could no longer continue with martial law. IJI( Islamic Democratic Alliance) was Nawaz Sharif’s party, while the PPP was Bhutto’s political party. The Bhutto and the Sharif family had a history of contempt towards each other. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had nationalized the Ittefaq Industry(which was Nawaz Sharif’s father’s industry). Sharif, however, was able to get his father’s industry de-nationalized when he served under Zia Ul Haq’s regime(he served as Punjab’s finance minister). Thus, the mistrust between these two candidates had been established before the two even contested for elections. The PPP was able to win the elections, and it soon asserted its authority over the IJI. Nawaz Sharif had his popularity in Punjab, and he immediately defied Bhutto’s central authority. Bhutto replied in kind as well; “The federal government (of Benazir Bhutto) attempted to break Sharif’s confrontational resolve by hurting the economic interests of his family’s vast industrial empire.” Nawaz Sharif had also been accused of using Jamat-e-Islami in the 1988 elections to portray Bhutto as a scandalous politician who was insistent on destroying Pakistan’s Islamic identity. Bhutto and Sharif’s relationship through the decade of democracy can be described best as one that was filled with utter lack of tolerance, complete disrespect and an eager desire for the failure of the other’s political party. There was nothing democratic about either of these two candidates when they were NOT in office.
2. The Progressive Stance: Surprisingly enough, there were some policies of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto that did exhibit a similar progressive stance. Benazir Bhutto, after getting elected in 1988, urged for normalization of relations with India, along with the decrease in support of the proxy war against India in disputed Kashmir. Benazir Bhutto was also an advocate of maintaining American ties(after the Soviet withdrawal). Nawaz Sharif similarly in his second term (February 17th, 1997-October 12th, 1999) emphasized on normalization of relations with India (via trade). It was during this term that then Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee made the famous visit to Lahore’s sacred sites, along with the bus ride from Lahore back to India, which was seen as a goodwill gesture towards Nawaz Sharif’s diplomatic efforts. Nawaz Sharif was also one not to be shy of seeking American assistance, as he desperately tried to get Clinton to resolve the Kargil predicament when Pakistan’s soldiers were caught infiltrating disputed territory. However, both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto would meet their demise due to their pro-India/America/Progressive stance. Benazir Bhutto was removed by the military for being too soft and lenient towards India, as well as allegedly revealing secrets about Pakistan’s uranium program to the United States. Nawaz Sharif similarly was met with much contempt from the army when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee came to visit Lahore. The army chief refused to greet Vajpayee at a ceremony held for the Indian Prime Minister.
A large portion of Pakistan’s resentment towards India lies in the education curriculum and the symbolic Islamic character inhabited by the politicians/leaders of the country. The leaders have continuously used anti-Indian sentiment to remain in power and to gather political support. This anti- India sentiment met its match with the HYPER-Islamic character of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Leaders have continuously used symbolic language in order to unite Pakistanis to combat India while simultaneously strengthening their own political leadership. Zulfiqar Bhutto displayed such characteristics when he described the nuclear program( which started in 1972) as the “Islamic Bomb” project. He combined his launch of the Islamic Bomb with open hatred towards India, which essentially meant that the Pakistani people were united by one thing and one thing only; Anti-Indianism. The best tool used by Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to unite all Pakistanis was indeed this notion that India possessed everything un-islamic and that Pakistanis had to unite to fight for their brothers in Kashmir against evil Indian forces. India’s role in trying to normalize relations with Pakistan over the past 60 years can best be described as insincere as well. The four wars that have been fought by these two nations have revolved around the issue of Kashmir. India’s refusal to allow International Human Rights groups combined with their refusal to initiate dialogue has only added fuel to the fire. Pakistani leaders also have notoriously been alleged to support insurgent groups in the past in the Kashmir region.
Thus, the history of non-appreciation towards each other has ensured that the citizens of Pakistan and India not entertain a policy that revolves around normalization of relations/ initiation of dialogue. This can be seen in their absolute disgust with Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto when they both tried to initiate dialogue with India in relation to Kashmir and trade( 1988 and 1999 respectively). It is not within the Pakistani psyche(and arguably the Indian psyche) to initiate dialogue-normalizing relations. This psyche has been maintained primarily by our leaders(both democratic and Generals) and passive Indian policy towards Kashmir, thus Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto were destined not to be able to succeed in that regard. America also was looked upon unfavorably after they refused to supply Pakistan with aid after the Cold War due to Pakistan's nuclear enrichment program. This came as a shock to all Pakistanis, especially after the U.S.A primarily used proxy forces within Pakistan to combat Soviet influence in Central Asia. Benazir Bhutto did not realize that any notion of normalizing relations with U.S.A was to be met with utter disdain by not only the military but the people as well.
3. The un-Democratic leadership: Perhaps what is most commonly known amongst Pakistani people is the irony that the Pakistani democratic leaders of the “decade of democracy” arguably were just as undemocratic as the military dictators had been. The suppression of opposing political parties, the censorship of the press and the propaganda initiated to defame one another was just as evident in the decade of democracy as it had ever been. During Benazir Bhutto’s two terms, her government(and her husband) were accused of corruption not only by local courts but three international courts. “ Corruption, always present, became a major domestic and political issue in the mid-1990’s, when Transparency Internaitonal (TI) began to rank Pakistan near or at the top of its index of corruption. The rankings initially came out during Benazir Bhutto’s administration.” Nawaz Sharif in 1988 used the internal wing of the ISI to aid his bid for leadership. This was a direct contradiction to what the ISI was primarily established for, which was providing Intel to the military in regards to foreign policy.
"During his second term, Sharif became even more undemocratic. Nawaz showed signs of deep insecurity by interfering with the operations of Pakistan’s judiciary and indulging in other abuses of power.” In fact, on November 28th 1997, in what can only be described as an act of barbarism, Nawaz Sharif and his party stormed the Supreme Court and destroyed proceedings because Mr. Sharif could no longer bear the contempt case that the Supreme Court was holding against him. Stephen Cohen, in describing the decade of democracy, explains it in rather simple terms; “ the decade of democracy from the late 1980s to the late 1990s saw ruinous economic policies, a high level of corruption, the rise of Islamic extremism, and (in the case of Nawaz government) abuses of human rights and civil liberties and a naked attack on major Pakistani institutions. Benazir was perhaps less ambitious, but her government was probably more corrupt.”
4. The Military: After Zia Ul Haq’s sudden death, the military was faced with a situation similar to the one that it faced in 1971. Pakistan was tired of the drawn out war in Afghanistan and it was in the process of absorbing 4 million Afghan refugees from the war in Afghanistan. Similarly, Zia Ul Haq had not lived up to his promises of establishing democracy in Pakistan (a false promise he infamously made in 1978 after invoking Martial Law). Thus, by the time Zia Ul Haq had ruled for more than the decade, the public was ready for a change just as it was when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came into office in 1971. Benazir Bhutto was a politician who clearly was not as ambitious or as strong as her father was. Unlike her father, Benazir Bhutto did not launch any FSF( Federal Security Force) to combat military’s control of civil disobedience. Instead, Bhutto’s tenure was doomed to fail before it even started. General Beg “ realized that the military as an institution had become unpopular after eleven years of dictatorship under one of its generals,” and thus found an alternative which “ would be to create a civilian façade that would allow the army to rule without causing the hatred that invariably results from intrusion into civilian life by men in uniform.” Bhutto, unlike her father, did not have even a hint of an opportunity in asserting absolute civilian rule over Pakistan. After all, it took the military just seven years after its chaotic Operation Searchlight in 1971 to assert rule over Pakistan once again. Benazir Bhutto knew that, and it is no surprise that “ Bhutto also agreed to maintain existing levels of defense spending and assured General Beg that she would not interfere with the military’s privileges and perquisites.” Bhutto tried what her father could not (or did not) do. She wanted to break away from the irregular warfare mentality and Pakistan’s use of Islam with it, both in Kashmir and in Afghanistan. Similarly, she was willing to publicly restrict Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program. This policy ironically was a world away from her father’s own policy, and the military found it easy to step in and remove her from office.
Nawaz Sharif, on the other hand, went towards the other extreme. He exhibited traits similar to Zulfiqar Bhutto when he was in power in the 1970’s. After having been dismissed in the first term, Sharif knew what he had to do in order to stay in office for a prolonged period; he had to decrease military influence in Pakistan. He first did this by appointing all the prime powers with the Prime Minister while making the Presidency of Pakistan a mere symbolic position( Rafiq Tarar was President then). After he had established himself as the sole authority figure in politices, he then moved towards combating the military. The first mistake he made was when he forced General Karamat to resign in 1998. General Karamat was seen as a man of honor, and people often cite him as the General who was never interested in politics. He similarly played a passive/aggressive role in Operation Kargil in 1999( the operation would see Pakistani soldiers infiltrate disputed territory). When the Indian government found out about Operation Kargil, they accused Nawaz Sharif of being a traitor towards the diplomatic effort he had launched earlier in the year with Atul Vajpayee. Nawaz Sharif stopped the operations, and the military felt betrayed, as they accused him of knowing about Operation Kargil. On October 12th, 1999 Nawaz Sharif did the unthinkable. He fired Pervaiz Musharraf( then Chief of Staff) while the Army Chief was 30,000 feet in the air. This exhibited Nawaz Sharif’s insecurities, and the rest is history as he was removed from power from the military.
The military rightly viewed the democratic leadership of Pakistan as a ticking time bomb. Nawaz Sharif’s relationship with the military self-destructed due to his undemocratic policies, while Benazhir Bhutto’s leadership self-destructed due to her absolute submission towards the military. We have a case of two politicians who displayed two different extremes towards the military. Neither of them could form a workable relationship with the military. One wonders whether a possible Bhutto/Sharif collaboration in the 90’s could have served Pakistan’s democracy with a much more prosperous future. However, that would have never happened, as can be seen through the points cited above.
Saeed Shafqat, a Pakistani historian, summarized best why Pakistani democracy in the 90’s failed.
“ Since military rule has been persistent, and democratic government remained an illusion, the political elites have little experience with democratic rule… Political leaders are not only inexperienced in democratic tradition but also find it difficult to hold democratic values…Vendetta and suppression of opponents is the norm rather than the exception.”
The Primary Authors I have used/been inspired by have been
Stephen Cohen
Owen Bennett Jones
Roedad Khan
Hussain Haqqani
Saeed Shafqat
