"Adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures"
Stated above is Article 5 of the Objectives Resolution passed in 1949 By Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. An hour ago, Minority Minister Shahbaz Bhatti was assassinated by gunmen in Islamabad. The most probable motive of assassination is his stance on the blasphemy law, which he believed to be flawed.
This has sadly been the story of our nation over the past 64 years. Religion has been a sensitive spot in Pakistan's fragile political history, and its role in Pakistan's history has led to much violence and hatred. Perhaps those that have suffered most have been the minorities. The most popular example that comes to mind is the persecution of the Ahmadis, which due to political pressure from the right-wing conservatives were declared non-Muslims in 1974.Perhaps what is remarkable is that 21 years before, in 1953, those same radical clerics were suppressed by the Pakistan government and military for advocating chaos in Lahore. Such was the drastic change in political thinking. In 1974, Zulfiqar Bhutto accepted the declaration of AHmadi's as non-Muslims. In 1977 he similarly gave in to pressure from Islamists by promising to implement Sharia Law, combined with the ban on drinking and gambling in the social sphere. It was all a ploy to stay in power, yet he was replaced by the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq.
Zia's crowning achievement was his usurpation of the Constitution when he suspended all the political institutions and declared himself sole ruler of Pakistan. In 1981, he implemented the Hudood Ordinance( which was according to him in accords with Islamic Law). The problem was that much of Zia's role was very un-Islamic in nature, as he implemented laws without the deliberation of the people and the respected political parties. Zia-ul-Haq's biggest legacy was his removal of the notion of "rule by law" with the notion of rule by "coercion/fear." His infamous attributes included the suppression of political parties, the dismissal of governments(Junejo) combined with the constant abuse of the constitution. This was done through his infamous use of Islam as a political ploy in order to gain votes and stay in power.
The blasphemy law did not originate in 1986. Rather, it was the legacy of the Imperial British Crown, which sought to appease both the Hindus and Muslims in the pre-partition era. However, the law was loosely kept after the formation of Pakistan. From 1947 to 1985, there were next to no cases reported in relation to the accusation of blasphemy.
In 1986 Zia reformed the law, added amendments and thus the religious exploitation started. The amendments were not passed through to the parliament, but were rather made through the Majlis-e-Shoora, a panel of "religious clerics" hand-picked by Zia-ul-Haq. This Majlis-e-Shoora, which was completely inept in relation to constitutional governance, passed the amendments and since then the blasphemy cases have increased exponentially. Between 1947 and 1985, less than 50 cases were reported. Since 1986, there have been more than a thousand cases reported, with more than 50% of the accused being Muslims [ Conflicting reports, yet all have stated this]
Did Pakistan magically start becoming un-Islamic after 1986, according to these figures? The fact of the matter is that there has been no execution for the notion of "blasphemy" since 1986, which shows that amongst the thousands of cases reported, none have been strong enough to carry a death sentence. Hundreds of people are arrested over blasphemy laws. Some die in prison, some are still there awaiting justice, and some resolve their differences out of court. The most shocking example of the misuse of the blasphemy law was provided by Allama tahir. Ashrafi claimed that on 12 Rabbi-ul-Awal, two popular Sunni sects( Deobandis and Barelvis) were engaged in burning copies of the Quran in Faisalabad. Of course, the burning of the Quran was done to send a message to the other sect that their version of Islam was not the right one. Yet, these disputes(according to Tahir Ashrafi) were settled out of court. What does it tell us about how this law is carried out and how it is used by tribes/religious sects.
Our religious minorities have decreased from 24 % to a staggering 2 % in the span of 64 years. The question that arises is; Why has this question never been brought forth to the public forum? Why is it that when religions is interlinked with politics in Pakistan, the public starts putting labels on people? Why don't political leaders/scholars debate on this platform?
The answer lies in the transformation of the Pakistan political order. It was envisioned by Jinnah as one in which the rule of law would govern the citizens of Pakistan. However, in the 1970's and 1980's, with the leniency towards Islamic radicals by Zulfiqar Bhutto combined with Zia's unconstitutional vision of Islam, the political landscape has changed. Out of the two decades of unquestionable misinterpreted use of Islam, the rule of law has been replaced with the "rule by fear/coercion."
Political leaders have adopted policies from our leaders of the past by turning a blind eye towards the misuse of Islam in the political sphere. In order to gain votes and to appease religious conservatives, they don't take a hands-on approach towards the misuse of Islam in Pakistan's Constitution. Fearing political backlash, the political members just appease the religious conservatives by claiming to not be involved in anything that is "detrimental to Islam", may it be a law that has ben very un-islamic in its implementation.
The result of these political stances( or lack of them) has led to a public that is criminally misinformed in relation to the said law. Salmaan Taseer was killed for bringing to light the alarming misuse of the law, Shahbaz Bhatti has been killed due to his simple stance on adding amendments to the law that can make it more Islamic and more just. Javed Ghamidi lives in a self-imposed exile for debating the notion of whether this law is viable in accords to Islamic principles.
General Musharraf was the only person who was somewhat not tied to this political mindset. In 2006, he added the Women Protections Bill, which was an added amendment to the Hudood Ordinance. Designed to include forensic evidence in rape charges, the amendment was addd to try such cases under civil, and not Islamic courts. Musharraf was only able to add this amendment due to the fact that he was a military dictator. Public approval meant the same to him what it meant to Zia; nothing. In terms of analyzing constitutional laws, this is the extent one needs to reach to expand on constitutional laws. The amendment was criticized by Imran Khan, citing it as a ploy by Musharraf to appear moderate in the Western world. It was similarly criticized by Jamat-e-Islami clerics for trying to remove Islam from the political sphere. It is disgusting to realize that an amendment made to include advanced forensic evidence to enhance investigation was dismissed by parties left and right. This is the extent to which it has proven impossible to deal with debating amendments to flawed constitutional laws.
I will pray for Shahbaz Bhatti. He is yet another victim to the political rule by fear.
Allama Tahir Ashrafi is the only brave voice left fighting this ignorance that has crippled the mind of Pakistanis. May God give him the strength to stay alive, and may more people listen to his message.
Tuesday, March 1, 2011
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
ISLAMISM & THE ARMY: HOW KAYANI SHOULD ACT AFTER THE GOVERNOR’S ASSASSINATION
In February of 1953, there was an imminent threat towards the destruction of law and order in Pakistan. Islamic-based parties ferociously campaigned on forcing the government to pass a law that declared the Ahmadis non-Muslims. Similarly, they also wanted the civilian government to pass a law that would restrict Ahmadis from serving any positions related to the government or the army. The civilian government (led by Khawaja Nazimuddin) did not take the threats seriously, and they soon paid the price. Riots broke out in the streets of Lahore, and by March 6th the civilian government and the police had lost all control of law and order in Punjab. The civilian government, in a desperate bid to retain control of the situation, let the army intervene. Martial law was declared, and within a month, the riots were suppressed and law and order was restored in Pakistan. General Azam stepped in when the civilian government asked him to, and the army suppressed the forces that threatened the nation’s foundation (then best explained by the Objectives Resolution of 1949). [1]
Four coups and fifty-seven years later, the relationship between the civilian government and the army has completely broken down. Civilian governments have constantly displayed their inefficiency to properly govern, while military rule has constantly inserted itself into politics via the “doctrine of necessity.” Today, the civilian government is in a state of utmost fragility, as displayed by the inhumane assassination of the late Governor Mr. Salmaan Taseer last week. The assassination has sparked the debate once again about the sensitivity of Islam in the political sphere. Though it was maintained that the blasphemy law would not be changed, the religious parties still resorted to issuing fatwas and threats against the late Governor. The Governor had remained steadfast in his position on the misuse of the blasphemy law. Judging from the track record of the implementation of the blasphemy law, the governor was not mistaken. Just as the flaws in the other laws of our society, the blasphemy law (implemented in 1985 without the consent of the parliament) was a victim to our incompetent judicial system. The primary indication of this can be shown in the fact that more Muslims have been jailed for “alleged” blasphemy than any other religion, while there have not been any punishments carried out by the Higher Courts. Similarly, the case of arresting an alleged blasphemer has never required the presence of a separate judicial magistrate that can investigate the merits of each case. Most alarming of all, there is no exercise set in motion examining the validity of the accuser’s allegations[2]. Mr. Taseer was a victim to rising religious intolerance, ignorance and the misrepresentation by the media of what he actually critiqued.
The military meanwhile has remained silent, as experts ponder whether it is waiting for the civilian administration to implode just as it did in 1958, 1978 and 1999. The notion that the military has remained apolitical since Musharraf’s resignation is false. It was General Kayani who was instrumental in convincing Zardari in 2008 to give into the public pressure and reinstate the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court( Iftikhar Chaudhry). Similarly, General Kayani also played a significant role in the formation of the 18th Amendment, which would see the powers of the executive be more in accord with the 1973 Constitution[3]. Last, but not the least, it is General Kayani who plays the most executive role in determining the magnitude of Pakistan’s involvement in the war against extremism in Pakistan, especially the areas of North Waziristan and South Waziristan. The real question thus arises; is it within the interests of the military to be involved in this current saga? The answer is both yes and no.
In 1953, the army and the civilian government drew a clear line as to what was right and wrong. They preferred the preservation of our institutions as set by our Founders (protection of minorities) to the religious intolerance of our Islamic parties. However, much has changed in 57 years. Political leaders, both civil and military, have maintained strong ties with Islamist parties in order to prolong their political rule and advance nationalist causes. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave into the Islamist demands by declaring the Ahmadis as non-Muslims, along with his restriction of alcohol, gambling and his promise to declare Sharia Law within six months (he did not stay in power long enough to implement such laws). General Zia-ul-Haq(with the consent of the Americans) used Islamist forces to combat the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the militants have often been used by Army Chiefs as assets against India. Due to the uneasy relationship with the Islamist parties, combined with Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization of Pakistan’s institutions, Pakistan today can’t draw the line between what is black and white as it did in 1953. A possible critique by the Pakistan army of the Islamist parties or the radical elements of Islam may lead to a backlash far worse than the one that Musharraf faced with the siege of the Lal Masjid(which some saw as an attack by a secular army chief towards Islam). It is important to have a brief overview of the shifting balance of Islam within the army institution of Pakistan over the course of the past 64 years.
The Pakistan army has been known to be very secular in nature throughout most of its history. Pakistan’s military till the 1970’s was very liberal in its outlook, as a lot of the army officers traced their origins to fighting for the British during World War II. The army personal of higher and lower ranks had substantial interaction with Indian soldiers before partition. In fact, the first two Army Chiefs of Pakistan were British. Similarly, after the British influence had died due to decaying colonial imperialism, the Pakistani army turned towards the United States. Ayub Khan actively pursued an alliance with the United States during the Cold War, and many Pakistani soldiers went to the United States for training purposes. During the 70’s(after the fall of East Pakistan), Islamic values and military prowess started to dominate the army institution[4]. The two main reasons for this change were the lack of military unity following the 1971 war (the end of the U.S./Pak alliance), combined with Zia-ul-Haq’s tenure of nine years. Anti-Indianism, the manipulation of the education curriculum and the viewpoint of “ the us vs. them” mentality were changing the shape of the military institution.
Even though Zia died, his legacy remained within the institution. This was shown in 1995, when Major General Zahir-ul-Islam Abbasi tried to stage a coup within the military institution. Even though he failed, the growing Islamism within the military was there for all to see. Abbasi was inspired by the religious doctrines of the Islamist parties, and thus decided in September 1995 that he would take over the army institution. His reason? “ He had planned to storm the GHQ during a meeting of corps commanders, kill the participants, arrest other prominent personalities and impose sharia, or Islamic law…Abbasi planned to proclaim himself not only the chief of the army staff but also the leader of the faithful, or Amir ul Momineen”[5]. General Jahangir Karmat slowly eroded Zia-ul-Haq’s influence by advocating unofficial set of guidelines that did not see “religious-minded” military personal receive higher promotions. It is safe to assume that General Musharraf was also like-minded with this approach within the military institutions. Politically, he did ban tribes such as Lashkir-e-Taiba, however he similarly allowed all the religious parties considerable momentum with his toleration of the MMA(an alliance of many religious parties).
General Kayani and the army’s role in the operation against the militants in SWAT was seen as a welcoming sign, as it united Pakistanis initially against rising extremist forces which challenged Pakistan’s sovereignty. However, the enthusiasm has died over the past 18 months, as suicide bombings have increased exponentially, combined with the highly unpopular drone strikes. Kayani realizes this, and he has been known to play his cards very shrewdly, as he contemplates a future for Afghanistan in which there exists a government that is not hostile towards Pakistan. This has all led to the army’s apolitical behavior on the surface of things.
Even though the military has mostly played sensitive to not stirring up religious sentiments, they have acted fast towards the concept of justice when it threatened their own lives. During Musharraf’s reign, there had been many failed assassination attempts. One of the assassination attempts involved a soldier named Islamuddin Siddiqui, who was a combatant in the Pakistan army. He was soon executed for his role in conspiring against Musharraf. Qadri and Siddiqui are not all too dissimilar in terms of their respected cases. Siddiqui conspired to kill Musharraf due to Musharraf’s viewpoint on tackling what he believed to be a misrepresentation of Islam (namely the Taliban and the insurgent groups). Salman Taseer was combating the misuse of the blasphemy law, which had been exploited for personal gains( Salman Taseer’s case is actually a lot stronger, as he never endangered any lives with his critique of the implementation of the blasphemy law). If Islamuddin Siddiqui had been successful in assassinating Musharraf, there is no doubt that the military would have carried out speedy justice regardless of what the public sentiment might have been towards Musharraf. Mumtaz Qadri was responsible for the unlawful death of a politician who only stood up for the oppressed, and he (Qadri) deserves speedy justice at the hands of a fair and impartial judiciary.
If the civilian government is unable to prosecute (or handle) Qadri due to the lawlessness of those who try to suppress “insaaf,” then the military needs to step in. The army would not have to intervene in order to defend or repeal the blasphemy law, but rather like in the situation of 1953, it would need to be called out to the streets to restore law and order. This way, they can at least project an image that they have been called into action not due to their political inclinations, but rather as a last resort by the civilian administration in order to save the nation. The army loves to play the “doctrne of necessity,” and in this situation it could possibly benefit both institutions. Kayani likes to think long-term, and this is a situation where he absolutely has to think as such. Islamist parties have long been tolerated for expressing their unreasonable viewpoints through force and coercions in regards to religion. However, another line would be drawn if they try to challenge a judicial verdict or try to negatively influence a judiciary (through threats or fatwas). Should there be any instant in which Mumtaz Qadri’s court hearing does not go in accords with the law, or that he is not handed out his proper punishment due to the lack of the ability of the government to tackle opposition forces, Kayani should not turn the other way. If he does, it will not only endanger whatever is left of Pakistan’s judicial system, it will also detriment all hopes for a stable Pakistan in the future, one that the army would probably be interested in ruling again one day.
SOURCES:
1.Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954( Punjab Disturbances 1953)
2.For more information on the history of the blasphemy law in Pakistan, see the link: http://mazdoorkissan.wordpress.com/2010/11/13/blasphemy-and-the-death- penalty-asia-bibis-case/
3.General in The 'Hood. Indrani Bagchi.
4.Stephen Cohen. The Idea of Pakistan. P. 102-3
5.Owen Bennett Jones. Eye of the Storm. P. 262
Four coups and fifty-seven years later, the relationship between the civilian government and the army has completely broken down. Civilian governments have constantly displayed their inefficiency to properly govern, while military rule has constantly inserted itself into politics via the “doctrine of necessity.” Today, the civilian government is in a state of utmost fragility, as displayed by the inhumane assassination of the late Governor Mr. Salmaan Taseer last week. The assassination has sparked the debate once again about the sensitivity of Islam in the political sphere. Though it was maintained that the blasphemy law would not be changed, the religious parties still resorted to issuing fatwas and threats against the late Governor. The Governor had remained steadfast in his position on the misuse of the blasphemy law. Judging from the track record of the implementation of the blasphemy law, the governor was not mistaken. Just as the flaws in the other laws of our society, the blasphemy law (implemented in 1985 without the consent of the parliament) was a victim to our incompetent judicial system. The primary indication of this can be shown in the fact that more Muslims have been jailed for “alleged” blasphemy than any other religion, while there have not been any punishments carried out by the Higher Courts. Similarly, the case of arresting an alleged blasphemer has never required the presence of a separate judicial magistrate that can investigate the merits of each case. Most alarming of all, there is no exercise set in motion examining the validity of the accuser’s allegations[2]. Mr. Taseer was a victim to rising religious intolerance, ignorance and the misrepresentation by the media of what he actually critiqued.
The military meanwhile has remained silent, as experts ponder whether it is waiting for the civilian administration to implode just as it did in 1958, 1978 and 1999. The notion that the military has remained apolitical since Musharraf’s resignation is false. It was General Kayani who was instrumental in convincing Zardari in 2008 to give into the public pressure and reinstate the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court( Iftikhar Chaudhry). Similarly, General Kayani also played a significant role in the formation of the 18th Amendment, which would see the powers of the executive be more in accord with the 1973 Constitution[3]. Last, but not the least, it is General Kayani who plays the most executive role in determining the magnitude of Pakistan’s involvement in the war against extremism in Pakistan, especially the areas of North Waziristan and South Waziristan. The real question thus arises; is it within the interests of the military to be involved in this current saga? The answer is both yes and no.
In 1953, the army and the civilian government drew a clear line as to what was right and wrong. They preferred the preservation of our institutions as set by our Founders (protection of minorities) to the religious intolerance of our Islamic parties. However, much has changed in 57 years. Political leaders, both civil and military, have maintained strong ties with Islamist parties in order to prolong their political rule and advance nationalist causes. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave into the Islamist demands by declaring the Ahmadis as non-Muslims, along with his restriction of alcohol, gambling and his promise to declare Sharia Law within six months (he did not stay in power long enough to implement such laws). General Zia-ul-Haq(with the consent of the Americans) used Islamist forces to combat the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the militants have often been used by Army Chiefs as assets against India. Due to the uneasy relationship with the Islamist parties, combined with Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization of Pakistan’s institutions, Pakistan today can’t draw the line between what is black and white as it did in 1953. A possible critique by the Pakistan army of the Islamist parties or the radical elements of Islam may lead to a backlash far worse than the one that Musharraf faced with the siege of the Lal Masjid(which some saw as an attack by a secular army chief towards Islam). It is important to have a brief overview of the shifting balance of Islam within the army institution of Pakistan over the course of the past 64 years.
The Pakistan army has been known to be very secular in nature throughout most of its history. Pakistan’s military till the 1970’s was very liberal in its outlook, as a lot of the army officers traced their origins to fighting for the British during World War II. The army personal of higher and lower ranks had substantial interaction with Indian soldiers before partition. In fact, the first two Army Chiefs of Pakistan were British. Similarly, after the British influence had died due to decaying colonial imperialism, the Pakistani army turned towards the United States. Ayub Khan actively pursued an alliance with the United States during the Cold War, and many Pakistani soldiers went to the United States for training purposes. During the 70’s(after the fall of East Pakistan), Islamic values and military prowess started to dominate the army institution[4]. The two main reasons for this change were the lack of military unity following the 1971 war (the end of the U.S./Pak alliance), combined with Zia-ul-Haq’s tenure of nine years. Anti-Indianism, the manipulation of the education curriculum and the viewpoint of “ the us vs. them” mentality were changing the shape of the military institution.
Even though Zia died, his legacy remained within the institution. This was shown in 1995, when Major General Zahir-ul-Islam Abbasi tried to stage a coup within the military institution. Even though he failed, the growing Islamism within the military was there for all to see. Abbasi was inspired by the religious doctrines of the Islamist parties, and thus decided in September 1995 that he would take over the army institution. His reason? “ He had planned to storm the GHQ during a meeting of corps commanders, kill the participants, arrest other prominent personalities and impose sharia, or Islamic law…Abbasi planned to proclaim himself not only the chief of the army staff but also the leader of the faithful, or Amir ul Momineen”[5]. General Jahangir Karmat slowly eroded Zia-ul-Haq’s influence by advocating unofficial set of guidelines that did not see “religious-minded” military personal receive higher promotions. It is safe to assume that General Musharraf was also like-minded with this approach within the military institutions. Politically, he did ban tribes such as Lashkir-e-Taiba, however he similarly allowed all the religious parties considerable momentum with his toleration of the MMA(an alliance of many religious parties).
General Kayani and the army’s role in the operation against the militants in SWAT was seen as a welcoming sign, as it united Pakistanis initially against rising extremist forces which challenged Pakistan’s sovereignty. However, the enthusiasm has died over the past 18 months, as suicide bombings have increased exponentially, combined with the highly unpopular drone strikes. Kayani realizes this, and he has been known to play his cards very shrewdly, as he contemplates a future for Afghanistan in which there exists a government that is not hostile towards Pakistan. This has all led to the army’s apolitical behavior on the surface of things.
Even though the military has mostly played sensitive to not stirring up religious sentiments, they have acted fast towards the concept of justice when it threatened their own lives. During Musharraf’s reign, there had been many failed assassination attempts. One of the assassination attempts involved a soldier named Islamuddin Siddiqui, who was a combatant in the Pakistan army. He was soon executed for his role in conspiring against Musharraf. Qadri and Siddiqui are not all too dissimilar in terms of their respected cases. Siddiqui conspired to kill Musharraf due to Musharraf’s viewpoint on tackling what he believed to be a misrepresentation of Islam (namely the Taliban and the insurgent groups). Salman Taseer was combating the misuse of the blasphemy law, which had been exploited for personal gains( Salman Taseer’s case is actually a lot stronger, as he never endangered any lives with his critique of the implementation of the blasphemy law). If Islamuddin Siddiqui had been successful in assassinating Musharraf, there is no doubt that the military would have carried out speedy justice regardless of what the public sentiment might have been towards Musharraf. Mumtaz Qadri was responsible for the unlawful death of a politician who only stood up for the oppressed, and he (Qadri) deserves speedy justice at the hands of a fair and impartial judiciary.
If the civilian government is unable to prosecute (or handle) Qadri due to the lawlessness of those who try to suppress “insaaf,” then the military needs to step in. The army would not have to intervene in order to defend or repeal the blasphemy law, but rather like in the situation of 1953, it would need to be called out to the streets to restore law and order. This way, they can at least project an image that they have been called into action not due to their political inclinations, but rather as a last resort by the civilian administration in order to save the nation. The army loves to play the “doctrne of necessity,” and in this situation it could possibly benefit both institutions. Kayani likes to think long-term, and this is a situation where he absolutely has to think as such. Islamist parties have long been tolerated for expressing their unreasonable viewpoints through force and coercions in regards to religion. However, another line would be drawn if they try to challenge a judicial verdict or try to negatively influence a judiciary (through threats or fatwas). Should there be any instant in which Mumtaz Qadri’s court hearing does not go in accords with the law, or that he is not handed out his proper punishment due to the lack of the ability of the government to tackle opposition forces, Kayani should not turn the other way. If he does, it will not only endanger whatever is left of Pakistan’s judicial system, it will also detriment all hopes for a stable Pakistan in the future, one that the army would probably be interested in ruling again one day.
SOURCES:
1.Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954( Punjab Disturbances 1953)
2.For more information on the history of the blasphemy law in Pakistan, see the link: http://mazdoorkissan.wordpress.com/2010/11/13/blasphemy-and-the-death- penalty-asia-bibis-case/
3.General in The 'Hood. Indrani Bagchi.
4.Stephen Cohen. The Idea of Pakistan. P. 102-3
5.Owen Bennett Jones. Eye of the Storm. P. 262
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
The Origins of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy with the United States
On October 22nd, 2010 it was announced that Washington would be providing the Pakistan military with a new $2 billion military aid package in a joint effort to combat extremism in Afghanistan (And North-West regions of Pakistan). The general consensus amongst Pakistanis has not been one of enthusiasm as they generally feel that the United States/Pakistan military diplomacy cripples not only Pakistan’s future as a stable state but also appears contrary to Pakistan’s identity. The people of Pakistan have also questioned the United States and their intentions in regards to being engaged in a fragile relationship with Pakistan. If one is to understand whether our current diplomacy with the United States appears contrary to our identity, one has to examine the origins of not only our current foreign policy with the United States, but the origins of diplomacy with the United States and what caused that diplomacy to connect.
The origin of Pakistan’s foreign policy has not been shaped by Pakistan’s quest for imperial dominance or a sense of commercial expansionism. It has rather been shaped by one factor. Pakistan’s struggle for survival originated itself in the late 1940’s and has characterized Pakistani diplomacy ever since. The partition of India made sure that Pakistan inherited problems that would quite simply be impossible to tackle. Pakistan inherited three main problems.
1. India’s reluctance to initially accept Pakistan: Husain Haqqani, in his book “Between Mosque and Military” and Stephen Cohen in his book “ The Idea of Pakistan” share similar sentiments in regards to how India and its leaders perceived the independence of Pakistan. According to Haqqani, “when Pakistan was finally born, it faced an environment of insecurity and hostility, with many Indian leaders predicting the early demise of the new country.” Cohen shares similar sentiments. “ The Indian National Congress had accepted partition grudgingly, expecting a fairly immediate collapse.”
2. Pakistan’s non-existent Economy due to partition: Cohen and Haqqani also share similar viewpoints in regards to how the partition adversely affected Pakistan’s economy. Haqqani, in analyzing the newly established Pakistan industries, writes, “Pakistan produced 75 percent of the world’s jute supply but did not have a single jute-processing mill. All the mills were in India. Although one-third of undivided India’s cotton was grown in Pakistan, it had ‘only one-thirtieth of the cotton mills… The flight of capital was attributed to ‘uncertainties about Pakistan’s capacity to survive and the communal disturbances…within days of independence, Pakistan was concerned about its share of India’s assets, both financial and military. India’s decision to delay transferring Pakistan’s share of assets increased the bitterness of partition.” Infact, Stephen Cohen writes critically that the obvious detrimental effects of partition were so incriminating against India that “ it was Gandhi who undertook a fast unto death to protest India’s retention of Pakistan’s assets and Hindu and Sikh attacks on Muslims in India.”
3. Kashmir: Perhaps what the final striking blow between India and Pakistan was Pakistan’s notion that India (Nehru) had refused to fulfill his promise of a Kashmir plebiscite in 1947. Hari Singh, who was a Hindu ruler of a Muslim-majority Kashmir in 1947, had to chose on whether to accede to Pakistan, India or stay independent. The Maharaja was primarily interested in economic benefits and was not influenced by the emotions of partition, as he had enjoyed a great level of autonomy during Colonial rule in India. The Maharaja was motivated essentially by economic stability, thus he decided to accede to India in return for commercial/economic benefits( due to partition favoring India in terms of stable institutions). The Muslims in Pakistan felt betrayed, and thus tribal groups from NWFP tried to restore Kashmir under Muslim rule. Due to lack of co-ordination between Pakistan’s (new formed) army and the rebel fighters, they were not successful, and thus Kashmir’s proposed elections went into a state of limbo. What ignited furor amongst Pakistanis was also the fact was Junagarh’s(Hindu majority state) assimilation with India, even though it had a Muslim ruler.
Pakistan’s viewpoint of India deceiving them with promised plebiscites only ensured their perspective that India was “against” Pakistan. Pakistan’s frustration only grew as time went by due to their lack of political influence over the region. Walter Wallbank writes that by the mid 1950’s the Kashmir’s “ development had been in India’s favor. A constituent assembly had been elected which had ensured Sheikh Abdullah’s pro-Indian part, the National Conference, of overwhelming control of the country. To all intents and purposes only one party had been allowed to participate in this selection.” Kashmir would become Pakistan’s core issue for decades to come.
Pakistan was essentially a ticking time bomb. Its economy was dismantling before it could stand on its own two feet, while a bigger/more powerful nation was waiting for its imminent demise. While Pakistan was figuring out its internal problems, it had to set a mandate for its external policies, namely its diplomacy. Driven primarily by economic interests along with security against India, Pakistan went out to take advantage of the Cold War syndrome. As the weaker nation, Pakistan’s establishment decided to seek alliance with the Western world. Perhaps what is most interesting is the fact that even though Pakistan’s diplomacy with the United States was shaped primarily after Jinnah’s death, Jinnah would have envisioned the same kind of foreign policy as that employed by the leaders that succeeded him.
In an interview with Life Magazine in 1947, Jinnah claimed that “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America…Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed…. [on] the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.” Centering Pakistan as a pivotal geographical location for the chess game between the United States and Russia, Jinnah claimed that “America is now awakened,” and “ if Russia walks in here, the whole world is menaced.” Jinnah would finally assert; “surely America will give us loans to keep Russia from walking in.” Thus, Pakistan’s diplomacy in the 1950’s was in actuality a mere continuation of what her Founder had envisioned. Jinnah understood Pakistan’s vulnerability, and he understood that Pakistan’s geographical position could be pivotal in securing its economic/military interest for the future.
The unofficial war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir in 1948 created paranoia amongst Pakistani leaders that India would seize upon any opportunity to purposely weaken Pakistan and its sovereignty. Pakistan army’s (alleged) use of irregular forces in 1948 only raised the question as to how strong the Pakistan army really was, and whether it could sustain a possible attack from India. Besides, Pakistan’s military institution never wanted to create an illusion that they were militarily weaker than India(even though India’s population alone makes a striking case against Pakistan’s military). Kashmir as an issue was far from solved for Pakistani leaders in the 1950’s, and thus they envisioned foreign assistance that would strengthen their military institution for a possible future operation in Kashmir.
According to historian Walter Walbank, Liaqat Ali Khan enforced Jinnah’s viewpoint in 1951. “ Liaquat Ali Khan…went to the United States and Canada. Apparently it was the prime minister’s tactic to use the possibility of Russian ties as a means of exerting pressure on Western nations, especially in obtaining support in Kashmir… Pakistan definitely moved away from a position of non-alignment in the direction of closer relations with the West, especially the Untied States.” Pakistan’s defense treaty with the United States ensured that a substantial amount of military equipment be made available to Pakistan[Some estimates claim that United States covered 50% expense of Pakistan’s total budget of defense]. The strong ties between the United States and Pakistan would also be shown in Pakistan’s association with The Baghdad Pact of 1955, which assured Pakistan’s strong link with the United States in fighting Soviet Communism in Central Asia.
As Stephen Cohen notes, “ From 1954 to 1965 Pakistan was allowed to purchase weapons and received a mixture of military assistance in the form of grants and aid…This enabled it to build a modern army and a very efficient air force whose quality was enhanced by cooperative arrangement with several Gulf States.” The magnitude of United States’ military assistance to Pakistan is clearly evident by the fact that General Ayub Khan in 1965 launched “Operation Gibralter” to liberate Kashmir. The failure of Operation Gibraltar, combined with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s policy of alienation towards the United States ended the first term of military assistance by the United States to Pakistan. The second Phase would start in 1979 with Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s foreign relations in the late 1940’s and 1950’s were formed primarily by its internal dilemmas that it faced. Fear from India’s superior military institution( due to partition and population) combined with the unfortunate state of the economy due to the 1947 partition made Pakistan rely on a foreign entity that would ensure its survival. The United States required Pakistan as an ally in order to combat possible Soviet influence in Middle East/Asia, while Pakistan required the United States as an ally in order to essentially give her breathing space against its nemesis India. Pakistan’s diplomacy in the late 1940’s and the decade of 1950’s was one structured by practicality. This practicality was essential to make a nation so hard-struck by partition survive. Perhaps what it is most ironic is the fact that 63 years later Pakistan is still in a rather similar state of “survival”, while its biggest military benefactor still remains the United States and India remains Pakistan’s biggest foe.
The origin of Pakistan’s foreign policy has not been shaped by Pakistan’s quest for imperial dominance or a sense of commercial expansionism. It has rather been shaped by one factor. Pakistan’s struggle for survival originated itself in the late 1940’s and has characterized Pakistani diplomacy ever since. The partition of India made sure that Pakistan inherited problems that would quite simply be impossible to tackle. Pakistan inherited three main problems.
1. India’s reluctance to initially accept Pakistan: Husain Haqqani, in his book “Between Mosque and Military” and Stephen Cohen in his book “ The Idea of Pakistan” share similar sentiments in regards to how India and its leaders perceived the independence of Pakistan. According to Haqqani, “when Pakistan was finally born, it faced an environment of insecurity and hostility, with many Indian leaders predicting the early demise of the new country.” Cohen shares similar sentiments. “ The Indian National Congress had accepted partition grudgingly, expecting a fairly immediate collapse.”
2. Pakistan’s non-existent Economy due to partition: Cohen and Haqqani also share similar viewpoints in regards to how the partition adversely affected Pakistan’s economy. Haqqani, in analyzing the newly established Pakistan industries, writes, “Pakistan produced 75 percent of the world’s jute supply but did not have a single jute-processing mill. All the mills were in India. Although one-third of undivided India’s cotton was grown in Pakistan, it had ‘only one-thirtieth of the cotton mills… The flight of capital was attributed to ‘uncertainties about Pakistan’s capacity to survive and the communal disturbances…within days of independence, Pakistan was concerned about its share of India’s assets, both financial and military. India’s decision to delay transferring Pakistan’s share of assets increased the bitterness of partition.” Infact, Stephen Cohen writes critically that the obvious detrimental effects of partition were so incriminating against India that “ it was Gandhi who undertook a fast unto death to protest India’s retention of Pakistan’s assets and Hindu and Sikh attacks on Muslims in India.”
3. Kashmir: Perhaps what the final striking blow between India and Pakistan was Pakistan’s notion that India (Nehru) had refused to fulfill his promise of a Kashmir plebiscite in 1947. Hari Singh, who was a Hindu ruler of a Muslim-majority Kashmir in 1947, had to chose on whether to accede to Pakistan, India or stay independent. The Maharaja was primarily interested in economic benefits and was not influenced by the emotions of partition, as he had enjoyed a great level of autonomy during Colonial rule in India. The Maharaja was motivated essentially by economic stability, thus he decided to accede to India in return for commercial/economic benefits( due to partition favoring India in terms of stable institutions). The Muslims in Pakistan felt betrayed, and thus tribal groups from NWFP tried to restore Kashmir under Muslim rule. Due to lack of co-ordination between Pakistan’s (new formed) army and the rebel fighters, they were not successful, and thus Kashmir’s proposed elections went into a state of limbo. What ignited furor amongst Pakistanis was also the fact was Junagarh’s(Hindu majority state) assimilation with India, even though it had a Muslim ruler.
Pakistan’s viewpoint of India deceiving them with promised plebiscites only ensured their perspective that India was “against” Pakistan. Pakistan’s frustration only grew as time went by due to their lack of political influence over the region. Walter Wallbank writes that by the mid 1950’s the Kashmir’s “ development had been in India’s favor. A constituent assembly had been elected which had ensured Sheikh Abdullah’s pro-Indian part, the National Conference, of overwhelming control of the country. To all intents and purposes only one party had been allowed to participate in this selection.” Kashmir would become Pakistan’s core issue for decades to come.
Pakistan was essentially a ticking time bomb. Its economy was dismantling before it could stand on its own two feet, while a bigger/more powerful nation was waiting for its imminent demise. While Pakistan was figuring out its internal problems, it had to set a mandate for its external policies, namely its diplomacy. Driven primarily by economic interests along with security against India, Pakistan went out to take advantage of the Cold War syndrome. As the weaker nation, Pakistan’s establishment decided to seek alliance with the Western world. Perhaps what is most interesting is the fact that even though Pakistan’s diplomacy with the United States was shaped primarily after Jinnah’s death, Jinnah would have envisioned the same kind of foreign policy as that employed by the leaders that succeeded him.
In an interview with Life Magazine in 1947, Jinnah claimed that “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America…Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed…. [on] the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.” Centering Pakistan as a pivotal geographical location for the chess game between the United States and Russia, Jinnah claimed that “America is now awakened,” and “ if Russia walks in here, the whole world is menaced.” Jinnah would finally assert; “surely America will give us loans to keep Russia from walking in.” Thus, Pakistan’s diplomacy in the 1950’s was in actuality a mere continuation of what her Founder had envisioned. Jinnah understood Pakistan’s vulnerability, and he understood that Pakistan’s geographical position could be pivotal in securing its economic/military interest for the future.
The unofficial war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir in 1948 created paranoia amongst Pakistani leaders that India would seize upon any opportunity to purposely weaken Pakistan and its sovereignty. Pakistan army’s (alleged) use of irregular forces in 1948 only raised the question as to how strong the Pakistan army really was, and whether it could sustain a possible attack from India. Besides, Pakistan’s military institution never wanted to create an illusion that they were militarily weaker than India(even though India’s population alone makes a striking case against Pakistan’s military). Kashmir as an issue was far from solved for Pakistani leaders in the 1950’s, and thus they envisioned foreign assistance that would strengthen their military institution for a possible future operation in Kashmir.
According to historian Walter Walbank, Liaqat Ali Khan enforced Jinnah’s viewpoint in 1951. “ Liaquat Ali Khan…went to the United States and Canada. Apparently it was the prime minister’s tactic to use the possibility of Russian ties as a means of exerting pressure on Western nations, especially in obtaining support in Kashmir… Pakistan definitely moved away from a position of non-alignment in the direction of closer relations with the West, especially the Untied States.” Pakistan’s defense treaty with the United States ensured that a substantial amount of military equipment be made available to Pakistan[Some estimates claim that United States covered 50% expense of Pakistan’s total budget of defense]. The strong ties between the United States and Pakistan would also be shown in Pakistan’s association with The Baghdad Pact of 1955, which assured Pakistan’s strong link with the United States in fighting Soviet Communism in Central Asia.
As Stephen Cohen notes, “ From 1954 to 1965 Pakistan was allowed to purchase weapons and received a mixture of military assistance in the form of grants and aid…This enabled it to build a modern army and a very efficient air force whose quality was enhanced by cooperative arrangement with several Gulf States.” The magnitude of United States’ military assistance to Pakistan is clearly evident by the fact that General Ayub Khan in 1965 launched “Operation Gibralter” to liberate Kashmir. The failure of Operation Gibraltar, combined with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s policy of alienation towards the United States ended the first term of military assistance by the United States to Pakistan. The second Phase would start in 1979 with Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s foreign relations in the late 1940’s and 1950’s were formed primarily by its internal dilemmas that it faced. Fear from India’s superior military institution( due to partition and population) combined with the unfortunate state of the economy due to the 1947 partition made Pakistan rely on a foreign entity that would ensure its survival. The United States required Pakistan as an ally in order to combat possible Soviet influence in Middle East/Asia, while Pakistan required the United States as an ally in order to essentially give her breathing space against its nemesis India. Pakistan’s diplomacy in the late 1940’s and the decade of 1950’s was one structured by practicality. This practicality was essential to make a nation so hard-struck by partition survive. Perhaps what it is most ironic is the fact that 63 years later Pakistan is still in a rather similar state of “survival”, while its biggest military benefactor still remains the United States and India remains Pakistan’s biggest foe.
Monday, October 18, 2010
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif: Why Pakistani Democracy in the 90's was not successful
On 17th August 1988, Zia Ul Haq mysteriously died in a plane crash. His 11-year tyrannical tenure was marked with rising Islamization of Pakistan, combined with the absolute manipulation of the education curriculum. Perhaps the most damaging aspect of his rule was his absolute suppression of political parties that opposed his leadership. However, in the 1980’s, with the help of the resilience of Muhammad Khan Junejo and the MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy), Pakistan would finally see its long awaited return to democracy. On December 1st, 1988, after a long struggle of fighting military dictatorship, Pakistan and the Islamic world would witness its first women Prime Minister. Benazir Bhutto would start a new era in Pakistani Politics, namely the decade of Democracy. However, this era/period of a little more than a decade would come to a screeching halt on October 12th, 1999 as General Pervaiz Musharraf would invoke Martial Law to remove Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The Pakistani public on October 12th 1999 did not exhibit the same enthusiasm towards its democratically elected leaders as it did eleven years ago. Rather, people were generally content with the re-establishment of military rule in Pakistan. How did the decade of democracy fail to an extent that just eleven years after Benazir Bhutto’s parliamentary victory people looked upon her and her archrival Nawaz Sharif with utter disdain? This can best be described by 4 simple factors.
1. Benazir Bhutto vs. Nawaz Sharif: The decade of democracy can generally be described as one long war between Pakistan’s two most popular leaders. After Zia Ul Haq’s death, power was up for grabs in Pakistan, as the military knew that it could no longer continue with martial law. IJI( Islamic Democratic Alliance) was Nawaz Sharif’s party, while the PPP was Bhutto’s political party. The Bhutto and the Sharif family had a history of contempt towards each other. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had nationalized the Ittefaq Industry(which was Nawaz Sharif’s father’s industry). Sharif, however, was able to get his father’s industry de-nationalized when he served under Zia Ul Haq’s regime(he served as Punjab’s finance minister). Thus, the mistrust between these two candidates had been established before the two even contested for elections. The PPP was able to win the elections, and it soon asserted its authority over the IJI. Nawaz Sharif had his popularity in Punjab, and he immediately defied Bhutto’s central authority. Bhutto replied in kind as well; “The federal government (of Benazir Bhutto) attempted to break Sharif’s confrontational resolve by hurting the economic interests of his family’s vast industrial empire.” Nawaz Sharif had also been accused of using Jamat-e-Islami in the 1988 elections to portray Bhutto as a scandalous politician who was insistent on destroying Pakistan’s Islamic identity. Bhutto and Sharif’s relationship through the decade of democracy can be described best as one that was filled with utter lack of tolerance, complete disrespect and an eager desire for the failure of the other’s political party. There was nothing democratic about either of these two candidates when they were NOT in office.
2. The Progressive Stance: Surprisingly enough, there were some policies of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto that did exhibit a similar progressive stance. Benazir Bhutto, after getting elected in 1988, urged for normalization of relations with India, along with the decrease in support of the proxy war against India in disputed Kashmir. Benazir Bhutto was also an advocate of maintaining American ties(after the Soviet withdrawal). Nawaz Sharif similarly in his second term (February 17th, 1997-October 12th, 1999) emphasized on normalization of relations with India (via trade). It was during this term that then Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee made the famous visit to Lahore’s sacred sites, along with the bus ride from Lahore back to India, which was seen as a goodwill gesture towards Nawaz Sharif’s diplomatic efforts. Nawaz Sharif was also one not to be shy of seeking American assistance, as he desperately tried to get Clinton to resolve the Kargil predicament when Pakistan’s soldiers were caught infiltrating disputed territory. However, both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto would meet their demise due to their pro-India/America/Progressive stance. Benazir Bhutto was removed by the military for being too soft and lenient towards India, as well as allegedly revealing secrets about Pakistan’s uranium program to the United States. Nawaz Sharif similarly was met with much contempt from the army when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee came to visit Lahore. The army chief refused to greet Vajpayee at a ceremony held for the Indian Prime Minister.
A large portion of Pakistan’s resentment towards India lies in the education curriculum and the symbolic Islamic character inhabited by the politicians/leaders of the country. The leaders have continuously used anti-Indian sentiment to remain in power and to gather political support. This anti- India sentiment met its match with the HYPER-Islamic character of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Leaders have continuously used symbolic language in order to unite Pakistanis to combat India while simultaneously strengthening their own political leadership. Zulfiqar Bhutto displayed such characteristics when he described the nuclear program( which started in 1972) as the “Islamic Bomb” project. He combined his launch of the Islamic Bomb with open hatred towards India, which essentially meant that the Pakistani people were united by one thing and one thing only; Anti-Indianism. The best tool used by Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to unite all Pakistanis was indeed this notion that India possessed everything un-islamic and that Pakistanis had to unite to fight for their brothers in Kashmir against evil Indian forces. India’s role in trying to normalize relations with Pakistan over the past 60 years can best be described as insincere as well. The four wars that have been fought by these two nations have revolved around the issue of Kashmir. India’s refusal to allow International Human Rights groups combined with their refusal to initiate dialogue has only added fuel to the fire. Pakistani leaders also have notoriously been alleged to support insurgent groups in the past in the Kashmir region.
Thus, the history of non-appreciation towards each other has ensured that the citizens of Pakistan and India not entertain a policy that revolves around normalization of relations/ initiation of dialogue. This can be seen in their absolute disgust with Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto when they both tried to initiate dialogue with India in relation to Kashmir and trade( 1988 and 1999 respectively). It is not within the Pakistani psyche(and arguably the Indian psyche) to initiate dialogue-normalizing relations. This psyche has been maintained primarily by our leaders(both democratic and Generals) and passive Indian policy towards Kashmir, thus Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto were destined not to be able to succeed in that regard. America also was looked upon unfavorably after they refused to supply Pakistan with aid after the Cold War due to Pakistan's nuclear enrichment program. This came as a shock to all Pakistanis, especially after the U.S.A primarily used proxy forces within Pakistan to combat Soviet influence in Central Asia. Benazir Bhutto did not realize that any notion of normalizing relations with U.S.A was to be met with utter disdain by not only the military but the people as well.
3. The un-Democratic leadership: Perhaps what is most commonly known amongst Pakistani people is the irony that the Pakistani democratic leaders of the “decade of democracy” arguably were just as undemocratic as the military dictators had been. The suppression of opposing political parties, the censorship of the press and the propaganda initiated to defame one another was just as evident in the decade of democracy as it had ever been. During Benazir Bhutto’s two terms, her government(and her husband) were accused of corruption not only by local courts but three international courts. “ Corruption, always present, became a major domestic and political issue in the mid-1990’s, when Transparency Internaitonal (TI) began to rank Pakistan near or at the top of its index of corruption. The rankings initially came out during Benazir Bhutto’s administration.” Nawaz Sharif in 1988 used the internal wing of the ISI to aid his bid for leadership. This was a direct contradiction to what the ISI was primarily established for, which was providing Intel to the military in regards to foreign policy.
"During his second term, Sharif became even more undemocratic. Nawaz showed signs of deep insecurity by interfering with the operations of Pakistan’s judiciary and indulging in other abuses of power.” In fact, on November 28th 1997, in what can only be described as an act of barbarism, Nawaz Sharif and his party stormed the Supreme Court and destroyed proceedings because Mr. Sharif could no longer bear the contempt case that the Supreme Court was holding against him. Stephen Cohen, in describing the decade of democracy, explains it in rather simple terms; “ the decade of democracy from the late 1980s to the late 1990s saw ruinous economic policies, a high level of corruption, the rise of Islamic extremism, and (in the case of Nawaz government) abuses of human rights and civil liberties and a naked attack on major Pakistani institutions. Benazir was perhaps less ambitious, but her government was probably more corrupt.”
4. The Military: After Zia Ul Haq’s sudden death, the military was faced with a situation similar to the one that it faced in 1971. Pakistan was tired of the drawn out war in Afghanistan and it was in the process of absorbing 4 million Afghan refugees from the war in Afghanistan. Similarly, Zia Ul Haq had not lived up to his promises of establishing democracy in Pakistan (a false promise he infamously made in 1978 after invoking Martial Law). Thus, by the time Zia Ul Haq had ruled for more than the decade, the public was ready for a change just as it was when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came into office in 1971. Benazir Bhutto was a politician who clearly was not as ambitious or as strong as her father was. Unlike her father, Benazir Bhutto did not launch any FSF( Federal Security Force) to combat military’s control of civil disobedience. Instead, Bhutto’s tenure was doomed to fail before it even started. General Beg “ realized that the military as an institution had become unpopular after eleven years of dictatorship under one of its generals,” and thus found an alternative which “ would be to create a civilian façade that would allow the army to rule without causing the hatred that invariably results from intrusion into civilian life by men in uniform.” Bhutto, unlike her father, did not have even a hint of an opportunity in asserting absolute civilian rule over Pakistan. After all, it took the military just seven years after its chaotic Operation Searchlight in 1971 to assert rule over Pakistan once again. Benazir Bhutto knew that, and it is no surprise that “ Bhutto also agreed to maintain existing levels of defense spending and assured General Beg that she would not interfere with the military’s privileges and perquisites.” Bhutto tried what her father could not (or did not) do. She wanted to break away from the irregular warfare mentality and Pakistan’s use of Islam with it, both in Kashmir and in Afghanistan. Similarly, she was willing to publicly restrict Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program. This policy ironically was a world away from her father’s own policy, and the military found it easy to step in and remove her from office.
Nawaz Sharif, on the other hand, went towards the other extreme. He exhibited traits similar to Zulfiqar Bhutto when he was in power in the 1970’s. After having been dismissed in the first term, Sharif knew what he had to do in order to stay in office for a prolonged period; he had to decrease military influence in Pakistan. He first did this by appointing all the prime powers with the Prime Minister while making the Presidency of Pakistan a mere symbolic position( Rafiq Tarar was President then). After he had established himself as the sole authority figure in politices, he then moved towards combating the military. The first mistake he made was when he forced General Karamat to resign in 1998. General Karamat was seen as a man of honor, and people often cite him as the General who was never interested in politics. He similarly played a passive/aggressive role in Operation Kargil in 1999( the operation would see Pakistani soldiers infiltrate disputed territory). When the Indian government found out about Operation Kargil, they accused Nawaz Sharif of being a traitor towards the diplomatic effort he had launched earlier in the year with Atul Vajpayee. Nawaz Sharif stopped the operations, and the military felt betrayed, as they accused him of knowing about Operation Kargil. On October 12th, 1999 Nawaz Sharif did the unthinkable. He fired Pervaiz Musharraf( then Chief of Staff) while the Army Chief was 30,000 feet in the air. This exhibited Nawaz Sharif’s insecurities, and the rest is history as he was removed from power from the military.
The military rightly viewed the democratic leadership of Pakistan as a ticking time bomb. Nawaz Sharif’s relationship with the military self-destructed due to his undemocratic policies, while Benazhir Bhutto’s leadership self-destructed due to her absolute submission towards the military. We have a case of two politicians who displayed two different extremes towards the military. Neither of them could form a workable relationship with the military. One wonders whether a possible Bhutto/Sharif collaboration in the 90’s could have served Pakistan’s democracy with a much more prosperous future. However, that would have never happened, as can be seen through the points cited above.
Saeed Shafqat, a Pakistani historian, summarized best why Pakistani democracy in the 90’s failed.
“ Since military rule has been persistent, and democratic government remained an illusion, the political elites have little experience with democratic rule… Political leaders are not only inexperienced in democratic tradition but also find it difficult to hold democratic values…Vendetta and suppression of opponents is the norm rather than the exception.”
The Primary Authors I have used/been inspired by have been
Stephen Cohen
Owen Bennett Jones
Roedad Khan
Hussain Haqqani
Saeed Shafqat
1. Benazir Bhutto vs. Nawaz Sharif: The decade of democracy can generally be described as one long war between Pakistan’s two most popular leaders. After Zia Ul Haq’s death, power was up for grabs in Pakistan, as the military knew that it could no longer continue with martial law. IJI( Islamic Democratic Alliance) was Nawaz Sharif’s party, while the PPP was Bhutto’s political party. The Bhutto and the Sharif family had a history of contempt towards each other. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had nationalized the Ittefaq Industry(which was Nawaz Sharif’s father’s industry). Sharif, however, was able to get his father’s industry de-nationalized when he served under Zia Ul Haq’s regime(he served as Punjab’s finance minister). Thus, the mistrust between these two candidates had been established before the two even contested for elections. The PPP was able to win the elections, and it soon asserted its authority over the IJI. Nawaz Sharif had his popularity in Punjab, and he immediately defied Bhutto’s central authority. Bhutto replied in kind as well; “The federal government (of Benazir Bhutto) attempted to break Sharif’s confrontational resolve by hurting the economic interests of his family’s vast industrial empire.” Nawaz Sharif had also been accused of using Jamat-e-Islami in the 1988 elections to portray Bhutto as a scandalous politician who was insistent on destroying Pakistan’s Islamic identity. Bhutto and Sharif’s relationship through the decade of democracy can be described best as one that was filled with utter lack of tolerance, complete disrespect and an eager desire for the failure of the other’s political party. There was nothing democratic about either of these two candidates when they were NOT in office.
2. The Progressive Stance: Surprisingly enough, there were some policies of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto that did exhibit a similar progressive stance. Benazir Bhutto, after getting elected in 1988, urged for normalization of relations with India, along with the decrease in support of the proxy war against India in disputed Kashmir. Benazir Bhutto was also an advocate of maintaining American ties(after the Soviet withdrawal). Nawaz Sharif similarly in his second term (February 17th, 1997-October 12th, 1999) emphasized on normalization of relations with India (via trade). It was during this term that then Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee made the famous visit to Lahore’s sacred sites, along with the bus ride from Lahore back to India, which was seen as a goodwill gesture towards Nawaz Sharif’s diplomatic efforts. Nawaz Sharif was also one not to be shy of seeking American assistance, as he desperately tried to get Clinton to resolve the Kargil predicament when Pakistan’s soldiers were caught infiltrating disputed territory. However, both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto would meet their demise due to their pro-India/America/Progressive stance. Benazir Bhutto was removed by the military for being too soft and lenient towards India, as well as allegedly revealing secrets about Pakistan’s uranium program to the United States. Nawaz Sharif similarly was met with much contempt from the army when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee came to visit Lahore. The army chief refused to greet Vajpayee at a ceremony held for the Indian Prime Minister.
A large portion of Pakistan’s resentment towards India lies in the education curriculum and the symbolic Islamic character inhabited by the politicians/leaders of the country. The leaders have continuously used anti-Indian sentiment to remain in power and to gather political support. This anti- India sentiment met its match with the HYPER-Islamic character of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Leaders have continuously used symbolic language in order to unite Pakistanis to combat India while simultaneously strengthening their own political leadership. Zulfiqar Bhutto displayed such characteristics when he described the nuclear program( which started in 1972) as the “Islamic Bomb” project. He combined his launch of the Islamic Bomb with open hatred towards India, which essentially meant that the Pakistani people were united by one thing and one thing only; Anti-Indianism. The best tool used by Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to unite all Pakistanis was indeed this notion that India possessed everything un-islamic and that Pakistanis had to unite to fight for their brothers in Kashmir against evil Indian forces. India’s role in trying to normalize relations with Pakistan over the past 60 years can best be described as insincere as well. The four wars that have been fought by these two nations have revolved around the issue of Kashmir. India’s refusal to allow International Human Rights groups combined with their refusal to initiate dialogue has only added fuel to the fire. Pakistani leaders also have notoriously been alleged to support insurgent groups in the past in the Kashmir region.
Thus, the history of non-appreciation towards each other has ensured that the citizens of Pakistan and India not entertain a policy that revolves around normalization of relations/ initiation of dialogue. This can be seen in their absolute disgust with Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto when they both tried to initiate dialogue with India in relation to Kashmir and trade( 1988 and 1999 respectively). It is not within the Pakistani psyche(and arguably the Indian psyche) to initiate dialogue-normalizing relations. This psyche has been maintained primarily by our leaders(both democratic and Generals) and passive Indian policy towards Kashmir, thus Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto were destined not to be able to succeed in that regard. America also was looked upon unfavorably after they refused to supply Pakistan with aid after the Cold War due to Pakistan's nuclear enrichment program. This came as a shock to all Pakistanis, especially after the U.S.A primarily used proxy forces within Pakistan to combat Soviet influence in Central Asia. Benazir Bhutto did not realize that any notion of normalizing relations with U.S.A was to be met with utter disdain by not only the military but the people as well.
3. The un-Democratic leadership: Perhaps what is most commonly known amongst Pakistani people is the irony that the Pakistani democratic leaders of the “decade of democracy” arguably were just as undemocratic as the military dictators had been. The suppression of opposing political parties, the censorship of the press and the propaganda initiated to defame one another was just as evident in the decade of democracy as it had ever been. During Benazir Bhutto’s two terms, her government(and her husband) were accused of corruption not only by local courts but three international courts. “ Corruption, always present, became a major domestic and political issue in the mid-1990’s, when Transparency Internaitonal (TI) began to rank Pakistan near or at the top of its index of corruption. The rankings initially came out during Benazir Bhutto’s administration.” Nawaz Sharif in 1988 used the internal wing of the ISI to aid his bid for leadership. This was a direct contradiction to what the ISI was primarily established for, which was providing Intel to the military in regards to foreign policy.
"During his second term, Sharif became even more undemocratic. Nawaz showed signs of deep insecurity by interfering with the operations of Pakistan’s judiciary and indulging in other abuses of power.” In fact, on November 28th 1997, in what can only be described as an act of barbarism, Nawaz Sharif and his party stormed the Supreme Court and destroyed proceedings because Mr. Sharif could no longer bear the contempt case that the Supreme Court was holding against him. Stephen Cohen, in describing the decade of democracy, explains it in rather simple terms; “ the decade of democracy from the late 1980s to the late 1990s saw ruinous economic policies, a high level of corruption, the rise of Islamic extremism, and (in the case of Nawaz government) abuses of human rights and civil liberties and a naked attack on major Pakistani institutions. Benazir was perhaps less ambitious, but her government was probably more corrupt.”
4. The Military: After Zia Ul Haq’s sudden death, the military was faced with a situation similar to the one that it faced in 1971. Pakistan was tired of the drawn out war in Afghanistan and it was in the process of absorbing 4 million Afghan refugees from the war in Afghanistan. Similarly, Zia Ul Haq had not lived up to his promises of establishing democracy in Pakistan (a false promise he infamously made in 1978 after invoking Martial Law). Thus, by the time Zia Ul Haq had ruled for more than the decade, the public was ready for a change just as it was when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came into office in 1971. Benazir Bhutto was a politician who clearly was not as ambitious or as strong as her father was. Unlike her father, Benazir Bhutto did not launch any FSF( Federal Security Force) to combat military’s control of civil disobedience. Instead, Bhutto’s tenure was doomed to fail before it even started. General Beg “ realized that the military as an institution had become unpopular after eleven years of dictatorship under one of its generals,” and thus found an alternative which “ would be to create a civilian façade that would allow the army to rule without causing the hatred that invariably results from intrusion into civilian life by men in uniform.” Bhutto, unlike her father, did not have even a hint of an opportunity in asserting absolute civilian rule over Pakistan. After all, it took the military just seven years after its chaotic Operation Searchlight in 1971 to assert rule over Pakistan once again. Benazir Bhutto knew that, and it is no surprise that “ Bhutto also agreed to maintain existing levels of defense spending and assured General Beg that she would not interfere with the military’s privileges and perquisites.” Bhutto tried what her father could not (or did not) do. She wanted to break away from the irregular warfare mentality and Pakistan’s use of Islam with it, both in Kashmir and in Afghanistan. Similarly, she was willing to publicly restrict Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program. This policy ironically was a world away from her father’s own policy, and the military found it easy to step in and remove her from office.
Nawaz Sharif, on the other hand, went towards the other extreme. He exhibited traits similar to Zulfiqar Bhutto when he was in power in the 1970’s. After having been dismissed in the first term, Sharif knew what he had to do in order to stay in office for a prolonged period; he had to decrease military influence in Pakistan. He first did this by appointing all the prime powers with the Prime Minister while making the Presidency of Pakistan a mere symbolic position( Rafiq Tarar was President then). After he had established himself as the sole authority figure in politices, he then moved towards combating the military. The first mistake he made was when he forced General Karamat to resign in 1998. General Karamat was seen as a man of honor, and people often cite him as the General who was never interested in politics. He similarly played a passive/aggressive role in Operation Kargil in 1999( the operation would see Pakistani soldiers infiltrate disputed territory). When the Indian government found out about Operation Kargil, they accused Nawaz Sharif of being a traitor towards the diplomatic effort he had launched earlier in the year with Atul Vajpayee. Nawaz Sharif stopped the operations, and the military felt betrayed, as they accused him of knowing about Operation Kargil. On October 12th, 1999 Nawaz Sharif did the unthinkable. He fired Pervaiz Musharraf( then Chief of Staff) while the Army Chief was 30,000 feet in the air. This exhibited Nawaz Sharif’s insecurities, and the rest is history as he was removed from power from the military.
The military rightly viewed the democratic leadership of Pakistan as a ticking time bomb. Nawaz Sharif’s relationship with the military self-destructed due to his undemocratic policies, while Benazhir Bhutto’s leadership self-destructed due to her absolute submission towards the military. We have a case of two politicians who displayed two different extremes towards the military. Neither of them could form a workable relationship with the military. One wonders whether a possible Bhutto/Sharif collaboration in the 90’s could have served Pakistan’s democracy with a much more prosperous future. However, that would have never happened, as can be seen through the points cited above.
Saeed Shafqat, a Pakistani historian, summarized best why Pakistani democracy in the 90’s failed.
“ Since military rule has been persistent, and democratic government remained an illusion, the political elites have little experience with democratic rule… Political leaders are not only inexperienced in democratic tradition but also find it difficult to hold democratic values…Vendetta and suppression of opponents is the norm rather than the exception.”
The Primary Authors I have used/been inspired by have been
Stephen Cohen
Owen Bennett Jones
Roedad Khan
Hussain Haqqani
Saeed Shafqat
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Analyzing the handling of the 1953 Anti-Ahmadi riots
As I have shown in my previous blog posts, I am opposed to the continuous military intervention that has taken place over the course of Pakistan's history. However, what would be idiotic of me would be to ignore the causes which led to the rise of the military. Even though I feel that the disdain that the Pakistani people have towards our civilian leaders has been unfair to some extent, I also share their pain in their frustration towards the civilian leaders. Obviously, there are many perspectives in regards to Pakistan's formation years, but the most critical period to be analyzed in understanding the rise of the military and the decay of the democratic/political power is from 1947-1958.
In this blogpost, I will analyze( through the help of sources) the anti-Ahmadi riots that took place in 1953 in Lahore over the course of 3 months. The Anti-Ahmadi riots stemmed from the fact that many of Pakistan's right-wing leaders and activists( including Maududi Sahab, founder of Jamat-e-Islami) were opposed to the fact that the Ahmadis were involved in the civil service sphere, and also could serve positions in the army.
Justice Munir and Justice Kiyani in 1954 compiled a fascinating 300 page report titled Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954 (Punjab Disturbances 1953. In it, they analyzed two factors that I believe are critical to our understanding of Pakistan today. First, they analyzed how the military stepped in to save Lahore from a state of chaos( through the complete mismanagement of the civilian leaders). Second, they excellently pointed out the outright ridiculous nature of the right-wing radical Islamists. Through his interrogation of Maududi, The Report shows just how alienated and hypocritical these conservative thinkers were in relation to Islam. In this blog, I will talk about the first factor( the handling of the Riots), and in the next blog will focus on Maududi).
* I do understand that the military/bureaucracy complex is essential in understanding how the military was able to assert itself directly into politics, however for the sake of convenience, I will explore that aspect in another blog*
Pakistan as a nation went through seven prime ministers from 1951 to 1958. During this time, Ayub Khan, who would become the first military dictator of Pakistan, solidified his position in order to take over the country. Even though critics of the military rightly point out the military’s intervention in the political sphere, they often do not link the shortcomings of the civilian leaders. Through the reading of the current Pakistan Ambassador to the USA(Husain Haqqani) text, it can certainly be shown as to how the military was able to stage a takeover in 1958. The military, Haqqani asserts, “had fought India in 1947-1948, helped resettle the refugees, and provided crucial assistance during national disasters such as floods.” Haqqani, in analyzing the anti-Ahmadi riots that broke out in Pakistan, asserts that “the military stepped in to deal with the symptoms of the chaos generated by religious-political agitation, without any effort to deal with its causes.” Former BBC Correspondent to Pakistan Owen Bennett Jones however finds a different perspective on the military’s role in Pakistan from 1947-58. Jones writes that “indeed, the army soon became the only organization capable of keeping order on all the streets, and in 1953 the relative power and competence of the military and the civilians became plain for all to see.” Jones then critiques the role of the civilian government in the rots by asserting that in 1953, “by March the civilian government had to admit that it had lost control of events and it asked the army to take over Lahore. The martial law administrator in the city, General Azam Khan, soon managed to restore calm…. In the eyes of many, martial law in Lahore proved that, whereas the civilian politicians consistently failed to provide effective government, the military could deliver. By asking the army to manage a political crisis the civilians had undermined their own authority.”
A careful examination of a Report that was written by Justice Munir( Supreme Court Justice) shows a similar picture in relation to the Anti-Ahmadi riots. In the " Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954 (Punjab Disturbances 1953),” the military is seen as the last force that stood between the civil government and the radical Islamists who created chaos in Lahore. Infact, the report critiques the civil government by saying that “the challenge of the Majlis-i-Amal was not treated seriously by either Government. Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din was hoping to the last moment that something happy will turn up, while the Provincial Government seemed satisfied that the agitation will start in Karachi.” The Report mocks the civilian government by saying that "The administrative machinery had completely failed and no one was willing or anxious to face the responsibility of enforcing the law, either by arresting offenders or preventing the perpetration of crime....the whole situation was treated as a peaceful theatrical performance where processions are stage-managed and slogans raised,for the benefit of a contented audience." The Report also adds that "The civil authorities, who in normal times are responsible for the maintenance of law and order, had become completely helpless and lost all desire and ability to cope with the situation that had developed on the morning of 6th March."
The Report claimed that in the fear of excessive bloodshed due to civil unrest, the civilian government was scared to give military control of Lahore when the riots took place. However, the Report defends the peaceful nature of the military by saying that “reluctance to hand over to the Army out of fear of bloodshed might be understandable if not exactly excusable, but what is the excuse for not adopting even the peaceable methods suggested and later employed by General Azam?” The Report further defends the army by stressing that “in Sialkot, at least two situations were handed over to the military, and there was no fear that the army might take such complete control of it as to oust civil authority. Nor was there any apprehension that there might be bloodshed.” The civilian government used the local police till March 6th, even though they knew that the Police was acting not within the accords of standard procedure. Infact, the Report criticizes the government's reluctance to employ military troops; " It may not be correct that the Army could be dispensed with altogether, but it is true that considerations extraneous to those of pure law and order have influenced the action of the civil authority. The Government were reluctant to employ the troops unreservedly, for fear of bloodshed, as Mr. Anwar Ali says, and the Ministers were upset with the protests of leading citizens that the police were firing even on violent crowds—even on violent crowds." General Azam, who was widely hailed by the Report and by the people for the management of the crisis, was frustrated with the civilian government's amateur handling of the situation.The Report affirms this explanation: "The military were not merely to act free of civil control; they were also to advise the civil authority where the situation was not being dealt with firmly. But we think we have heard from Mr.Chundrigar that General Azam did complain to him that the police had become demoralised, which should have made it clear to the civil authority that no situation was being dealt with firmly by the police."
The Report shows the ridiculous paranoia of the civilian leaders to not use the Army, even though the police was making a mockery of law and order. The civilian leadership, by going out of their way to not have the military involved, only added further chaos to the riots. Infact, the only thing that the civilian leaders wanted to do was to accuse the military of mismanaging the crisis, while not appreciating their intervension. Infact, the Report claims that " we were agreeably surprised to find from the evidence led before us that although every witness felt that the troops had not given of their best, they based their feeling on what they had heard from some other person. Ultimately, some of them referred us to the District Magistrate, and the District Magistrate told us he was perfectly satisfied with the part played by the troops."
Looking back at this Report, it is alarming to note the sheer incompetence of the civilian government. It is no wonder that the military was looked upon more in favor than the civilian government from 1947-58. The handling of these anti-Ahmadi riots provide a clear picture as to which entity was looked upon more favorably by the end of these riots. Khawaja Nazimuddin would be dismissed, Muhammad Ali Bogra would then become Prime Minister, and the facade of civilian leadership would evaporate even further, as the military would strengthen its grip.
* The Source that have helped me write this blog have been*
1. Owen Bennett Jones- Eye of the Storm
2. 1954 Justice Munir Report( God bless him for the Report)
3. Husain Haqqani- Betwen Mosque and Military
4. The Mullah and the Munir REport- Yasser Latif Hamdani
And many more
In this blogpost, I will analyze( through the help of sources) the anti-Ahmadi riots that took place in 1953 in Lahore over the course of 3 months. The Anti-Ahmadi riots stemmed from the fact that many of Pakistan's right-wing leaders and activists( including Maududi Sahab, founder of Jamat-e-Islami) were opposed to the fact that the Ahmadis were involved in the civil service sphere, and also could serve positions in the army.
Justice Munir and Justice Kiyani in 1954 compiled a fascinating 300 page report titled Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954 (Punjab Disturbances 1953. In it, they analyzed two factors that I believe are critical to our understanding of Pakistan today. First, they analyzed how the military stepped in to save Lahore from a state of chaos( through the complete mismanagement of the civilian leaders). Second, they excellently pointed out the outright ridiculous nature of the right-wing radical Islamists. Through his interrogation of Maududi, The Report shows just how alienated and hypocritical these conservative thinkers were in relation to Islam. In this blog, I will talk about the first factor( the handling of the Riots), and in the next blog will focus on Maududi).
* I do understand that the military/bureaucracy complex is essential in understanding how the military was able to assert itself directly into politics, however for the sake of convenience, I will explore that aspect in another blog*
Pakistan as a nation went through seven prime ministers from 1951 to 1958. During this time, Ayub Khan, who would become the first military dictator of Pakistan, solidified his position in order to take over the country. Even though critics of the military rightly point out the military’s intervention in the political sphere, they often do not link the shortcomings of the civilian leaders. Through the reading of the current Pakistan Ambassador to the USA(Husain Haqqani) text, it can certainly be shown as to how the military was able to stage a takeover in 1958. The military, Haqqani asserts, “had fought India in 1947-1948, helped resettle the refugees, and provided crucial assistance during national disasters such as floods.” Haqqani, in analyzing the anti-Ahmadi riots that broke out in Pakistan, asserts that “the military stepped in to deal with the symptoms of the chaos generated by religious-political agitation, without any effort to deal with its causes.” Former BBC Correspondent to Pakistan Owen Bennett Jones however finds a different perspective on the military’s role in Pakistan from 1947-58. Jones writes that “indeed, the army soon became the only organization capable of keeping order on all the streets, and in 1953 the relative power and competence of the military and the civilians became plain for all to see.” Jones then critiques the role of the civilian government in the rots by asserting that in 1953, “by March the civilian government had to admit that it had lost control of events and it asked the army to take over Lahore. The martial law administrator in the city, General Azam Khan, soon managed to restore calm…. In the eyes of many, martial law in Lahore proved that, whereas the civilian politicians consistently failed to provide effective government, the military could deliver. By asking the army to manage a political crisis the civilians had undermined their own authority.”
A careful examination of a Report that was written by Justice Munir( Supreme Court Justice) shows a similar picture in relation to the Anti-Ahmadi riots. In the " Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954 (Punjab Disturbances 1953),” the military is seen as the last force that stood between the civil government and the radical Islamists who created chaos in Lahore. Infact, the report critiques the civil government by saying that “the challenge of the Majlis-i-Amal was not treated seriously by either Government. Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din was hoping to the last moment that something happy will turn up, while the Provincial Government seemed satisfied that the agitation will start in Karachi.” The Report mocks the civilian government by saying that "The administrative machinery had completely failed and no one was willing or anxious to face the responsibility of enforcing the law, either by arresting offenders or preventing the perpetration of crime....the whole situation was treated as a peaceful theatrical performance where processions are stage-managed and slogans raised,for the benefit of a contented audience." The Report also adds that "The civil authorities, who in normal times are responsible for the maintenance of law and order, had become completely helpless and lost all desire and ability to cope with the situation that had developed on the morning of 6th March."
The Report claimed that in the fear of excessive bloodshed due to civil unrest, the civilian government was scared to give military control of Lahore when the riots took place. However, the Report defends the peaceful nature of the military by saying that “reluctance to hand over to the Army out of fear of bloodshed might be understandable if not exactly excusable, but what is the excuse for not adopting even the peaceable methods suggested and later employed by General Azam?” The Report further defends the army by stressing that “in Sialkot, at least two situations were handed over to the military, and there was no fear that the army might take such complete control of it as to oust civil authority. Nor was there any apprehension that there might be bloodshed.” The civilian government used the local police till March 6th, even though they knew that the Police was acting not within the accords of standard procedure. Infact, the Report criticizes the government's reluctance to employ military troops; " It may not be correct that the Army could be dispensed with altogether, but it is true that considerations extraneous to those of pure law and order have influenced the action of the civil authority. The Government were reluctant to employ the troops unreservedly, for fear of bloodshed, as Mr. Anwar Ali says, and the Ministers were upset with the protests of leading citizens that the police were firing even on violent crowds—even on violent crowds." General Azam, who was widely hailed by the Report and by the people for the management of the crisis, was frustrated with the civilian government's amateur handling of the situation.The Report affirms this explanation: "The military were not merely to act free of civil control; they were also to advise the civil authority where the situation was not being dealt with firmly. But we think we have heard from Mr.Chundrigar that General Azam did complain to him that the police had become demoralised, which should have made it clear to the civil authority that no situation was being dealt with firmly by the police."
The Report shows the ridiculous paranoia of the civilian leaders to not use the Army, even though the police was making a mockery of law and order. The civilian leadership, by going out of their way to not have the military involved, only added further chaos to the riots. Infact, the only thing that the civilian leaders wanted to do was to accuse the military of mismanaging the crisis, while not appreciating their intervension. Infact, the Report claims that " we were agreeably surprised to find from the evidence led before us that although every witness felt that the troops had not given of their best, they based their feeling on what they had heard from some other person. Ultimately, some of them referred us to the District Magistrate, and the District Magistrate told us he was perfectly satisfied with the part played by the troops."
Looking back at this Report, it is alarming to note the sheer incompetence of the civilian government. It is no wonder that the military was looked upon more in favor than the civilian government from 1947-58. The handling of these anti-Ahmadi riots provide a clear picture as to which entity was looked upon more favorably by the end of these riots. Khawaja Nazimuddin would be dismissed, Muhammad Ali Bogra would then become Prime Minister, and the facade of civilian leadership would evaporate even further, as the military would strengthen its grip.
* The Source that have helped me write this blog have been*
1. Owen Bennett Jones- Eye of the Storm
2. 1954 Justice Munir Report( God bless him for the Report)
3. Husain Haqqani- Betwen Mosque and Military
4. The Mullah and the Munir REport- Yasser Latif Hamdani
And many more
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
PEW Survey Analysis: Pakistan and its current perception
Only 8% of Pakistanis express confidence that Obama will do the right thing in world affairs, while 18% of Pakistanis believe Bin Laden can do the right thing in world affairs today.
These are some of the puzzling yet interesting statistics that I have come across in the PEW survey. While I believe I can use history and common sense to support most of these statistics, some of them are indeed beyond my understanding.
It is also important to note that we should take the survey with a grain of salt, as "The sample covers roughly 84% of the adult population." The report excluded areas of instability in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan. It also could not survey the FATA region, along with Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir.
It is interesting to note that "relatively few Pakistanis believe the situation in Afghanistan could have a serious impact on their country." It is interesting to note this Pakistani perception, considering the fact that 4 million Afghan refugees migrated to Pakistan after the end of the Soviet invasion. A lot of critics have linked this vast immigration to the drug trafficking problem in Pakistan today. Infact, the PEW report itself has said that seven-in-ten people say that illegal drugs are a big problem in Pakistan today. While I am not implying that the same will happen again, the future withdrawal of the US, NATO and International forces could have a similar impact in Afghanistan. It is entirely possible that there will be civil unrest in Afghanistan much like 1989 which will force many Afghanis to seek refuge in Pakistan again. 25 % of the people think it would be bad for Pakistan if the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan, however this is countered by 27% saying it would not matter if Taliban took over Afghanistan. Thus, an average Pakistani mindset does not have much of an opinion as to who should be in power in Afghanistan. However, in terms of Taliban as an organization, only 15% of Pakistanis have a favorable opinion of them. This is why only 20% of the Pakistani people are against the current military operations in FATA and North Waziristan. However, Pakistan people's lack of foresight in Afghanistan could prove to be detrimental once again, as Afghanistan's civil unrest in the past 3 decades has hugely affected Pakistan.
It is interesting to note that unlike Taliban and Al-Qaeda, 35% of the people do hold a positive view of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Lashkar-e-Taiba has been banned in Pakistan since 2002, but its history is deeply rooted in fighting for the liberation of Kashmiri people, which is still a crucial matter to most Pakistanis( supported by the survey). The most puzzling factor is that militant groups are more favored in Punjab than any other provinces. One would think that militant organizations would have more support in Balochistan or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where they are closer to the insurgency. Punjab has always had a sense of favortism in terms of economic and educational growth in comparison to other provinces. Ayub Khan's tenure was the start of this irregular economic development. Starting from Ayub Khan's era, our educational curriculum became a virus to its own people. Rather than operating in shades of gray, our educational curriculum has always operated with the easy "black and white" outlook towards history. From the refusal of the curriculum to accept the good(occasional) aspects of Colonial rule to the magical notion that Pakistan won the 65 and 71 war against India, our educational curriculum has crippled our students in terms of intellectual growth. Punjab has been the biggest victim to the curriculum, as our youth has been taught to identify an "absolute" enemy rather than a "just" enemy. The forces that drive our national politics are much like our educational system, e.g: the use of Islam to unite Pakistanis against all forces of evil( India, British Colonialists) or the creation of Bangladesh because of East Pakistan sabotage of Pakistan's Central government. Thus, it is without surprise that the militant groups are more favored in Punjab than any other provinces. The educational curriculum equips them to identify these militant organizations as liberators of Pakistan, and eventually Islam. This kind of survey frankly makes me wonder whether it has been a blessing in disguise that the other provinces haven't been privileged with our fantastic hyper-nationalistic curriculum that cripples the minds of our youth and has done so since the early 60's.
The PEW report also highlights a sense of injustice felt by Pakistanis. 47% of the people say Islam plays a fairly large role in the country. " Nearly nine-in-ten (88%) of those who see Islam playing a large role say that is is a good thing. Similarly, 79% of those who say Islam's role is small say that is a bad thing for their country." Thus, most Pakistanis do want Islam to play a role in the political sphere. In 2005, 63% said Islam played a large role. Whether there has been a decrease of the role of Islam in the political sphere is irrelevant, because Pakistanis right now do not welcome the lack of the Islam role in their society. We can definitely link this lack of role of Islam to the current disdain for Pakistan's government. The President's popularity has gone from 64% to a mere 20% today. "Fully 84$ of Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the way things are going in their country." What can we attribute these factors to? " About nine-in-ten consider terrorism (91%), lack of jobs (91%) and crime (88%) to be very big problems." The Pakistanis also do not shy away from blaming politics, as " currently, 74% say corrupt political leaders are a very big problem." Once again, whether leaders are corrupt or not is irrelevant to the dilemma, as the Pakistani people clearly display a lack of faith in them. I believe that from the statistics it can be inferred that the lack of jobs, crime, terrorism, corrupt politicians( allegedly) has all boiled down to the disapproval of the current government. The only thing that I can't explain and does not support my thesis is the fact that Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani still has 59% of approval from the population. Thus, in answer to all these problems, the population of Pakistan feels that the response to injustice should be the rising influence of Islam in the political sphere. This is why an astonishing 82% of the population " favor instituting harsh punishments such as stoning people who commit adultery, whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery." The Pakistani people are losing faith fast and strong in regards to the current punishment laws in the country. The lack of a system of justice has made them ponder about a more harsh alternative, as they believe that the current laws are having no effect in society. This is also why I personally believe that Nawaz Sharif is more popular than ever( 71 %). Nawaz Sharif has a history of being more traditional and religious in his policies. "On August 29, 1998 then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif proposed a law to create an Islamic order in Pakistan and establish a legal system based on the Quran and the Sunnat. Sharif told Pakistanis that the proposed Shariat Bill was a charter of duties and not power. This came a week after Sharif informally announced the measure during the commemoration the late President Zia ul-Haq’s 10-year death anniversary on August 17." It is important to note though that the Amendment never passed. I do understand that the only thing that does not support my Thesis is the fact that the Chief Justice still enjoys 61% of the popularity vote, however I believe much of it is due to his historic stance against Musharraf which have won him a lot of praise( including me).
Last, but not the least, the army still enjoys 84% of the popular vote in Pakistan. General Kayani also enjoys 61% of the popular vote amongst Pakistanis. This is staggering, considering the fact that Musharraf was removed from office only 2 years ago. The army has since then conducted a counter-insurgent operation which has won itself wide support throughout Pakistan. It is also interesting to note that even though 88% of the population cites terrorism as a huge threat, almost no one cites the military as one of the possible reasons as to why terrorism is still a big problem today. Clearly, the people do not associate the current government policies with the military's counter-insurgent operations. Their view of the military and the civilian government seems to be one of two independent train of thoughts rather than these two entities working in concert. It appears that the charm of Ayub Khan and his successors has carried on within the Pakistani mindset today( helped also by Zulfiqar Bhutto's vigorous anti-India stance). 74% of the population still ranks India as a threat to the nation, while only 54% of the population believes that Taliban is the main threat. I have to applaud the army on this statistic. Despite the loss of 38,000 civilians over the past 5 years by insurgent forces comprising of various Al-Qaeda/Taliban networks, the public is still more petrified of India than insurgent groups. The Pakistanis( rightly so) will not let go of the Kashmir dispute. 71 % of the population believes the problem of Kashmir to be a big problem for their country, while 65% believes are concerned with extremism. Kashmir indeed runs through the veins of the citizens of Pakistan, and India's refusal to grant privileges to Human Rights Communites access to the area is not going to stop this problem any time soon. Judging from the stats, the people understand that the liberators of Kashmir is not as much the civilian government, but rather the military( and to some extent the militant groups) themselves. This can also be attributed to the popular notion amongst Pakistani citizens today that India supports rebel groups in Balochistan and is trying to use its Afghanistan influence to dismantle Pakistan. The public should definitely not be blamed for this notion, as it is the leaders( military or civilian) that have largely used the anti-India stance in order to further their political means.
Even though about 60% of the people of Pakistan consider the U.S. as an enemy to their country, a staggering 64% of the people want to improve relations with the U.S. China similarly enjoys 84% popularity rate in Pakistan. While U.S. has supplied Pakistan with tremendous amount of aid, the survey finds that most Pakistanis are not even aware of this aid. I can't blame them, as phases of economic aid can never help a country which has little to no infrastructure to support such economic growth. Unfortunately, the dynamics of the current war in Afghanistan means that U.S. can't play China with Pakistan any time soon, as Pakistan's military involvement in the war is essential to their needs. The United States should find much solace in the fact that at least 64% want improved relations with the U.S. What do those improved relations entail? I can't answer that fully, but I do know that if 65% of Pakistan wants US and NATO forces to leave, it means they attribute the U.S. a lot to the current terrorism problems we face today. I also believe that the U.S. has had a detrimental impact in Pakistan( terrorism, Afghan refugees and drug trafficking), and a common man can absolutely be forgiven for perceiving the U.S. as such.
These are some of the puzzling yet interesting statistics that I have come across in the PEW survey. While I believe I can use history and common sense to support most of these statistics, some of them are indeed beyond my understanding.
It is also important to note that we should take the survey with a grain of salt, as "The sample covers roughly 84% of the adult population." The report excluded areas of instability in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan. It also could not survey the FATA region, along with Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir.
It is interesting to note that "relatively few Pakistanis believe the situation in Afghanistan could have a serious impact on their country." It is interesting to note this Pakistani perception, considering the fact that 4 million Afghan refugees migrated to Pakistan after the end of the Soviet invasion. A lot of critics have linked this vast immigration to the drug trafficking problem in Pakistan today. Infact, the PEW report itself has said that seven-in-ten people say that illegal drugs are a big problem in Pakistan today. While I am not implying that the same will happen again, the future withdrawal of the US, NATO and International forces could have a similar impact in Afghanistan. It is entirely possible that there will be civil unrest in Afghanistan much like 1989 which will force many Afghanis to seek refuge in Pakistan again. 25 % of the people think it would be bad for Pakistan if the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan, however this is countered by 27% saying it would not matter if Taliban took over Afghanistan. Thus, an average Pakistani mindset does not have much of an opinion as to who should be in power in Afghanistan. However, in terms of Taliban as an organization, only 15% of Pakistanis have a favorable opinion of them. This is why only 20% of the Pakistani people are against the current military operations in FATA and North Waziristan. However, Pakistan people's lack of foresight in Afghanistan could prove to be detrimental once again, as Afghanistan's civil unrest in the past 3 decades has hugely affected Pakistan.
It is interesting to note that unlike Taliban and Al-Qaeda, 35% of the people do hold a positive view of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Lashkar-e-Taiba has been banned in Pakistan since 2002, but its history is deeply rooted in fighting for the liberation of Kashmiri people, which is still a crucial matter to most Pakistanis( supported by the survey). The most puzzling factor is that militant groups are more favored in Punjab than any other provinces. One would think that militant organizations would have more support in Balochistan or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where they are closer to the insurgency. Punjab has always had a sense of favortism in terms of economic and educational growth in comparison to other provinces. Ayub Khan's tenure was the start of this irregular economic development. Starting from Ayub Khan's era, our educational curriculum became a virus to its own people. Rather than operating in shades of gray, our educational curriculum has always operated with the easy "black and white" outlook towards history. From the refusal of the curriculum to accept the good(occasional) aspects of Colonial rule to the magical notion that Pakistan won the 65 and 71 war against India, our educational curriculum has crippled our students in terms of intellectual growth. Punjab has been the biggest victim to the curriculum, as our youth has been taught to identify an "absolute" enemy rather than a "just" enemy. The forces that drive our national politics are much like our educational system, e.g: the use of Islam to unite Pakistanis against all forces of evil( India, British Colonialists) or the creation of Bangladesh because of East Pakistan sabotage of Pakistan's Central government. Thus, it is without surprise that the militant groups are more favored in Punjab than any other provinces. The educational curriculum equips them to identify these militant organizations as liberators of Pakistan, and eventually Islam. This kind of survey frankly makes me wonder whether it has been a blessing in disguise that the other provinces haven't been privileged with our fantastic hyper-nationalistic curriculum that cripples the minds of our youth and has done so since the early 60's.
The PEW report also highlights a sense of injustice felt by Pakistanis. 47% of the people say Islam plays a fairly large role in the country. " Nearly nine-in-ten (88%) of those who see Islam playing a large role say that is is a good thing. Similarly, 79% of those who say Islam's role is small say that is a bad thing for their country." Thus, most Pakistanis do want Islam to play a role in the political sphere. In 2005, 63% said Islam played a large role. Whether there has been a decrease of the role of Islam in the political sphere is irrelevant, because Pakistanis right now do not welcome the lack of the Islam role in their society. We can definitely link this lack of role of Islam to the current disdain for Pakistan's government. The President's popularity has gone from 64% to a mere 20% today. "Fully 84$ of Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the way things are going in their country." What can we attribute these factors to? " About nine-in-ten consider terrorism (91%), lack of jobs (91%) and crime (88%) to be very big problems." The Pakistanis also do not shy away from blaming politics, as " currently, 74% say corrupt political leaders are a very big problem." Once again, whether leaders are corrupt or not is irrelevant to the dilemma, as the Pakistani people clearly display a lack of faith in them. I believe that from the statistics it can be inferred that the lack of jobs, crime, terrorism, corrupt politicians( allegedly) has all boiled down to the disapproval of the current government. The only thing that I can't explain and does not support my thesis is the fact that Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani still has 59% of approval from the population. Thus, in answer to all these problems, the population of Pakistan feels that the response to injustice should be the rising influence of Islam in the political sphere. This is why an astonishing 82% of the population " favor instituting harsh punishments such as stoning people who commit adultery, whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery." The Pakistani people are losing faith fast and strong in regards to the current punishment laws in the country. The lack of a system of justice has made them ponder about a more harsh alternative, as they believe that the current laws are having no effect in society. This is also why I personally believe that Nawaz Sharif is more popular than ever( 71 %). Nawaz Sharif has a history of being more traditional and religious in his policies. "On August 29, 1998 then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif proposed a law to create an Islamic order in Pakistan and establish a legal system based on the Quran and the Sunnat. Sharif told Pakistanis that the proposed Shariat Bill was a charter of duties and not power. This came a week after Sharif informally announced the measure during the commemoration the late President Zia ul-Haq’s 10-year death anniversary on August 17." It is important to note though that the Amendment never passed. I do understand that the only thing that does not support my Thesis is the fact that the Chief Justice still enjoys 61% of the popularity vote, however I believe much of it is due to his historic stance against Musharraf which have won him a lot of praise( including me).
Last, but not the least, the army still enjoys 84% of the popular vote in Pakistan. General Kayani also enjoys 61% of the popular vote amongst Pakistanis. This is staggering, considering the fact that Musharraf was removed from office only 2 years ago. The army has since then conducted a counter-insurgent operation which has won itself wide support throughout Pakistan. It is also interesting to note that even though 88% of the population cites terrorism as a huge threat, almost no one cites the military as one of the possible reasons as to why terrorism is still a big problem today. Clearly, the people do not associate the current government policies with the military's counter-insurgent operations. Their view of the military and the civilian government seems to be one of two independent train of thoughts rather than these two entities working in concert. It appears that the charm of Ayub Khan and his successors has carried on within the Pakistani mindset today( helped also by Zulfiqar Bhutto's vigorous anti-India stance). 74% of the population still ranks India as a threat to the nation, while only 54% of the population believes that Taliban is the main threat. I have to applaud the army on this statistic. Despite the loss of 38,000 civilians over the past 5 years by insurgent forces comprising of various Al-Qaeda/Taliban networks, the public is still more petrified of India than insurgent groups. The Pakistanis( rightly so) will not let go of the Kashmir dispute. 71 % of the population believes the problem of Kashmir to be a big problem for their country, while 65% believes are concerned with extremism. Kashmir indeed runs through the veins of the citizens of Pakistan, and India's refusal to grant privileges to Human Rights Communites access to the area is not going to stop this problem any time soon. Judging from the stats, the people understand that the liberators of Kashmir is not as much the civilian government, but rather the military( and to some extent the militant groups) themselves. This can also be attributed to the popular notion amongst Pakistani citizens today that India supports rebel groups in Balochistan and is trying to use its Afghanistan influence to dismantle Pakistan. The public should definitely not be blamed for this notion, as it is the leaders( military or civilian) that have largely used the anti-India stance in order to further their political means.
Even though about 60% of the people of Pakistan consider the U.S. as an enemy to their country, a staggering 64% of the people want to improve relations with the U.S. China similarly enjoys 84% popularity rate in Pakistan. While U.S. has supplied Pakistan with tremendous amount of aid, the survey finds that most Pakistanis are not even aware of this aid. I can't blame them, as phases of economic aid can never help a country which has little to no infrastructure to support such economic growth. Unfortunately, the dynamics of the current war in Afghanistan means that U.S. can't play China with Pakistan any time soon, as Pakistan's military involvement in the war is essential to their needs. The United States should find much solace in the fact that at least 64% want improved relations with the U.S. What do those improved relations entail? I can't answer that fully, but I do know that if 65% of Pakistan wants US and NATO forces to leave, it means they attribute the U.S. a lot to the current terrorism problems we face today. I also believe that the U.S. has had a detrimental impact in Pakistan( terrorism, Afghan refugees and drug trafficking), and a common man can absolutely be forgiven for perceiving the U.S. as such.
Thursday, July 22, 2010
the History of Democracy's manipulation of the Chief of Army Staff position
On May 17th, 2010, Pakistan's defense minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar said that the government was "neither granting extension to chief of army staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani nor had the general sought it." Today,on July 22nd, it has been announced that Kayani has "accepted" the request by the civilian government for a 3 year extension to his tenure as Chief of Army Staff.
It goes without question that the military's role in Pakistan's government and politics has always been monumental. A case can be made that the civilian governments that have existed in Pakistan have never had the autonomy to rule without the threat of a military intervention. However,another angle that has never truly been appreciated or looked upon closely is the civilian government's role in the military, and more specifically its role with the history of the Chief of Army Staff position. The military entity of Pakistan, contrary to what some may believe, was not at its strongest in 1947( Uneven trade of arms with India, ill-equipped/trained soldiers, subject to British army chiefs till 51). Infact, scholars have claimed that the military and the civilian governments in the first decade of Pakistan's existence were not at extreme odds amongst one another. However, this balance has been commonly known to have been eliminated forever by 4 military coups( the first one starting at 1958).
I find that an unfair amount of emphasis has been focused on military's influence on democracy, and not on democracy/civilian government's influence on the military. Indeed, as I will show through historical examples, a case can be made that just as the military( and the COAS) led to the destruction of the balance between the civil and military institutions of Pakistan, the civilian governments have been no angels either. This will help us better understand how we should look at the PPP government's decision of extending Kayani's position as COAS.
Before any one comments on whether the CURRENT move by the government is correct or not, let us take a walk down history lane to see the history of COAS( Chief of Army Staff) extensions.
The first General to start the "extension" phenomena was unsurprisingly our very first "Muslim" and native COAS, General Ayub Khan. He succeeded General Sir Frank Messervy and General Sir Douglas Gracey by becoming the Chief of Staff on January 16, 1951. Ayub Khan's background as a military strategist and as a member of the armed forces can best be described as suspicious. Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, in her book "Military INC." stated that "Ayub Khan had received a bad ACR from his bosses prior to the partition of India and had become a general through machination." Major General Joginder Singh( who served in the Punjab regiment under Ayub Khan) stated that "Ayub Khan was not considered fit to command his parent Punjab Regiment and was relegated to serving in Chamar Regiment." At the time of independence, 9 officers were senior to Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan even concedes on pg. 20 in his book "Friends not Masters" that "I had little direct connection with the division of the armed forces." When Ayub became the first native COAS," he superseded two of his seniors, Maj Gen Muhammed Akbar Khan and Maj Gen N.A.M. Raza. Ayub Khan was promoted to C-in-C only due to the death of Maj Gen Iftikhar Khan.....Iskandar Mirza, Secretary of Defence, was instrumental in Ayub's promotion, commencing a relationship in which Mirza became Governor General of the Dominion of Pakistan and later President of Pakistan, when it became a republic on March 23, 1956. The events surrounding his appointment set the precedent for a Pakistani general being promoted out of turn, ostensibly because he was the least ambitious of the Generals and the most loyal."
It is also remarkable to note that Ayub Khan transformed from a Colonel to the COAS in a matter of 4 years. From 1951-1958, Ayub Khan enjoyed a large role in politics, as he served as Defense Minister in Pakistan from 1956-58( even though he was not a member of the parliament). It is of no surprise to me that Ayub Khan enjoyed the leisure of having extended his terms as COAS not once, but twice( officially at least). His background in the armed forces, combined by his colleague's account of his combat skills, make his tenure as COAS for 7 years very dubious. The Generals who preceded Ayub( even though they were British), had their terms last approximately 4 years combined. Meanwhile, if we do a comparison of India's COAS' after partition, we will find that not one of them had their term last 7 years, let alone 4.
All evidence shows Ayub Khan to not be the deserving COAS at the time of his appointment. It also connects his extensions as COAS to the democratic institutions. The civilian governments had a big role to play in Ayub Khan's extensions, and they kept him in check by providing him a civilian post( Defense Minister). The Civilian government ruined its own credibility by appointing a sitting member of the armed forces a position that only a member of the Parliament could possess. Civilian governments, or shall I say for a better punchline "Pakistani" democracy, shot itself in its own foot. Ayub Khan then dismissed the civilian government, and the rest is history.
A lot of other Generals have "extended" their tenures as COAS due to "popular demand by the people of Pakistan." However, a lot of them had their tenures extended when military rule was already in place. Thus, lets analyze those COAS who were NOT at odds with the civilian government.
General Tikka Khan served as COAS for 4 years under Zulfiqar Bhutto's regime. In 1971, when the army( influenced by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) launched "Operation Searchlight" against East Pakistan and Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, he became unanimously known as "The Butcher of Bengal." General Niazi( who was instrumental as well in the military operation) described in his book " The Betrayal of East Pakistan" that General Tikka Khan "resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched earth policy. His orders to his troops were: ' I want the land and not the people.'" General Tikka Khan would go on to serve as COAS from 72-76, and would also be appointed by Zulfiqar Bhutto as Defense Minister in 1977.
Owen Bennett Jones writes that General Karmat(96-98) " despairing of the sustained corruption and incompetence of the Sharif administration.... called for the establishment of a National Security Council." He was "forced to resignation" two days later by Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif would then appoint Musharraf as COAS over other senior officers. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also appointed Zia Ul Haq as COAS, appointing him ahead of seven Senior Generals. Nawaz Sharif went into exile for 9 years, and Zulfiqar Bhutto was executed.
The civilian leadership has made several blunders in relation to the handling of the COAS position in Pakistan's history. Infact, a case can be made that they were the original detractors of the sacred bond that existed between the civilian and military entities of Pakistan. Civilian leaders continued support for COAS to further their own political ends has been striking. It has led to the chess game between democracy and military, as the governance of Pakistan has just become a parody of its original self( Objectives Resolution 1949).
General Kayani does have my respect. His apparent position on the civilian government's role in the future of Pakistan can only be highly respected. Similarly, he has led the army to an unprecedented anti-terrorist campaign in the history of Pakistan, which( at least in May 2009) united all Pakistani's against extremism. However, I will remain wary of his extension.
The Civilian Government( Iskandar Mirza) thought of Ayub Khan as complying enough to extend his term twice. Z Bhutto thought of Zia as a pious enough man to not destroy the civilian government. Nawaz Sharif thought that Musharraf would not challenge Sharif's domestic reforms and keep to himself.
History will not be on Kayani's side. I only hope history can prove this article wrong, but I thought we studied history so that we could live and learn from it. Judging by today, we are once again the Pakistan of 1958.
Source credit goes to
1. Eye of the Storm
2. Between Mosque and Military
3. Friends not Masters
4. Betrayal of East Pakistan
5. Military INC.
6. Answers.com ( believe it or not0
7. defense.pk ( Pakistan Defense)
8. General Joginder Singh- Behind the Scenes
And many others!
It goes without question that the military's role in Pakistan's government and politics has always been monumental. A case can be made that the civilian governments that have existed in Pakistan have never had the autonomy to rule without the threat of a military intervention. However,another angle that has never truly been appreciated or looked upon closely is the civilian government's role in the military, and more specifically its role with the history of the Chief of Army Staff position. The military entity of Pakistan, contrary to what some may believe, was not at its strongest in 1947( Uneven trade of arms with India, ill-equipped/trained soldiers, subject to British army chiefs till 51). Infact, scholars have claimed that the military and the civilian governments in the first decade of Pakistan's existence were not at extreme odds amongst one another. However, this balance has been commonly known to have been eliminated forever by 4 military coups( the first one starting at 1958).
I find that an unfair amount of emphasis has been focused on military's influence on democracy, and not on democracy/civilian government's influence on the military. Indeed, as I will show through historical examples, a case can be made that just as the military( and the COAS) led to the destruction of the balance between the civil and military institutions of Pakistan, the civilian governments have been no angels either. This will help us better understand how we should look at the PPP government's decision of extending Kayani's position as COAS.
Before any one comments on whether the CURRENT move by the government is correct or not, let us take a walk down history lane to see the history of COAS( Chief of Army Staff) extensions.
The first General to start the "extension" phenomena was unsurprisingly our very first "Muslim" and native COAS, General Ayub Khan. He succeeded General Sir Frank Messervy and General Sir Douglas Gracey by becoming the Chief of Staff on January 16, 1951. Ayub Khan's background as a military strategist and as a member of the armed forces can best be described as suspicious. Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, in her book "Military INC." stated that "Ayub Khan had received a bad ACR from his bosses prior to the partition of India and had become a general through machination." Major General Joginder Singh( who served in the Punjab regiment under Ayub Khan) stated that "Ayub Khan was not considered fit to command his parent Punjab Regiment and was relegated to serving in Chamar Regiment." At the time of independence, 9 officers were senior to Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan even concedes on pg. 20 in his book "Friends not Masters" that "I had little direct connection with the division of the armed forces." When Ayub became the first native COAS," he superseded two of his seniors, Maj Gen Muhammed Akbar Khan and Maj Gen N.A.M. Raza. Ayub Khan was promoted to C-in-C only due to the death of Maj Gen Iftikhar Khan.....Iskandar Mirza, Secretary of Defence, was instrumental in Ayub's promotion, commencing a relationship in which Mirza became Governor General of the Dominion of Pakistan and later President of Pakistan, when it became a republic on March 23, 1956. The events surrounding his appointment set the precedent for a Pakistani general being promoted out of turn, ostensibly because he was the least ambitious of the Generals and the most loyal."
It is also remarkable to note that Ayub Khan transformed from a Colonel to the COAS in a matter of 4 years. From 1951-1958, Ayub Khan enjoyed a large role in politics, as he served as Defense Minister in Pakistan from 1956-58( even though he was not a member of the parliament). It is of no surprise to me that Ayub Khan enjoyed the leisure of having extended his terms as COAS not once, but twice( officially at least). His background in the armed forces, combined by his colleague's account of his combat skills, make his tenure as COAS for 7 years very dubious. The Generals who preceded Ayub( even though they were British), had their terms last approximately 4 years combined. Meanwhile, if we do a comparison of India's COAS' after partition, we will find that not one of them had their term last 7 years, let alone 4.
All evidence shows Ayub Khan to not be the deserving COAS at the time of his appointment. It also connects his extensions as COAS to the democratic institutions. The civilian governments had a big role to play in Ayub Khan's extensions, and they kept him in check by providing him a civilian post( Defense Minister). The Civilian government ruined its own credibility by appointing a sitting member of the armed forces a position that only a member of the Parliament could possess. Civilian governments, or shall I say for a better punchline "Pakistani" democracy, shot itself in its own foot. Ayub Khan then dismissed the civilian government, and the rest is history.
A lot of other Generals have "extended" their tenures as COAS due to "popular demand by the people of Pakistan." However, a lot of them had their tenures extended when military rule was already in place. Thus, lets analyze those COAS who were NOT at odds with the civilian government.
General Tikka Khan served as COAS for 4 years under Zulfiqar Bhutto's regime. In 1971, when the army( influenced by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) launched "Operation Searchlight" against East Pakistan and Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, he became unanimously known as "The Butcher of Bengal." General Niazi( who was instrumental as well in the military operation) described in his book " The Betrayal of East Pakistan" that General Tikka Khan "resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched earth policy. His orders to his troops were: ' I want the land and not the people.'" General Tikka Khan would go on to serve as COAS from 72-76, and would also be appointed by Zulfiqar Bhutto as Defense Minister in 1977.
Owen Bennett Jones writes that General Karmat(96-98) " despairing of the sustained corruption and incompetence of the Sharif administration.... called for the establishment of a National Security Council." He was "forced to resignation" two days later by Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif would then appoint Musharraf as COAS over other senior officers. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also appointed Zia Ul Haq as COAS, appointing him ahead of seven Senior Generals. Nawaz Sharif went into exile for 9 years, and Zulfiqar Bhutto was executed.
The civilian leadership has made several blunders in relation to the handling of the COAS position in Pakistan's history. Infact, a case can be made that they were the original detractors of the sacred bond that existed between the civilian and military entities of Pakistan. Civilian leaders continued support for COAS to further their own political ends has been striking. It has led to the chess game between democracy and military, as the governance of Pakistan has just become a parody of its original self( Objectives Resolution 1949).
General Kayani does have my respect. His apparent position on the civilian government's role in the future of Pakistan can only be highly respected. Similarly, he has led the army to an unprecedented anti-terrorist campaign in the history of Pakistan, which( at least in May 2009) united all Pakistani's against extremism. However, I will remain wary of his extension.
The Civilian Government( Iskandar Mirza) thought of Ayub Khan as complying enough to extend his term twice. Z Bhutto thought of Zia as a pious enough man to not destroy the civilian government. Nawaz Sharif thought that Musharraf would not challenge Sharif's domestic reforms and keep to himself.
History will not be on Kayani's side. I only hope history can prove this article wrong, but I thought we studied history so that we could live and learn from it. Judging by today, we are once again the Pakistan of 1958.
Source credit goes to
1. Eye of the Storm
2. Between Mosque and Military
3. Friends not Masters
4. Betrayal of East Pakistan
5. Military INC.
6. Answers.com ( believe it or not0
7. defense.pk ( Pakistan Defense)
8. General Joginder Singh- Behind the Scenes
And many others!
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